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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The familiar power of a federal regulatory commission to suspend
a proposed tariff change filed by a carrier or utility involves more than
the power-itself of more than passing significance-to delay the effec-
tive date of the proposed change. A failure by a commission to suspend
means that the burden of any future effort to dislodge or modify the
new rate will fall upon the challenger, whereas an exercise of the
suspension power conferred by the typical regulatory statute shifts the
burden of justification to the proponent of the change.1 Contested
rate proceedings are characteristically protracted, and the burden may
be costly, as well as difficult, to sustain.2 A regulated company may
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I This is illustrated by the case of Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
360 U.S. 378 (1959) (the CATCO case), in which producers of natural gas had
refused to accept certificates issued under § 7 of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 717f (1970), authorizing sales at a price lower than they had proposed, even though
the certificates would have permitted them to file immediately (subject to the Com-
mission's exercise of its power to suspend under §4 of the Natural Gas Act, 15
U.S.C. § 717c (1970)) for an increase to that level. The Federal Power Commission
thereupon retreated from its earlier position and issued certificates at the price sought
by the producers, stating that assurance of supply was the dominant consideration
and that it would promptly initiate an investigation under § 5 of the Gas Act, 15
U.S.C. §717d (1970), into the reasonableness of the rate. Commissioner Connole
dissented from this action, expressing the opinion that the "controlling reason" for
the producers' refusal to accept the certificates previously tendered was "their prefer-
ence for a proceeding in which the burden would be on the Commission to establish
that the rate was more than reasonable." Continental Oil Co., 17 F.P.C. 880, 885
(1957). As emphasized by the Supreme Court in reversing the agency, a further
consequence was that consumers would not have the benefit of §4's provision for
refund while protracted investigation was being conducted under § 5, which provides
only for prospective relief.
284 ICC AxN. REP. 114-15 (1970) gives that agency's data as to the average
time from the date of filing to the date of closing a case. In motor carrier investiga-
tion and suspension cases, the average time is 9.5 months in instances in which no
exceptions are taken to the recommended decision of the hearing officer. In instances
in which exceptions are taken and the final report is issued by the Commission, the
figure is 25 months. In instances in which an initial report is waived and the final
report issued by the Commission, the period averages 5.6 months. In rail carrier
investigation and suspension cases, the comparable figures are 21 months, 20 months,
and 7.7 months, respectively. These averages are based upon those cases that were
decided during fiscal year 1970. The Annual Report also furnishes data covering
cases during the 2 preceding fiscal years.
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conclude from an agency's decision to suspend that the game is not
worth the candle and withdraw its proposal. It is particularly likely to
do so if it believes that the action reflects hostility to the change. Or,
short of abandoning the proposal, the company may seek to determine
whether a modified version might escape the ban of suspension. Thus,
the use, or threatened use, of the power to suspend gives an agency
means of exerting leverage. If so disposed, it may be able to influence
or deter conduct by the regulated company through a process that is at
once summary and, at least in ordinary circumstances, unreviewable.
If one likens the administrative power to suspend to the power of a
court to grant a preliminary injunction, it might be said that the situa-
tion is one in which the power to grant preliminary injunctive relief
may, as a practical matter, carry with it the power to dispose of the
whole case or, short of that, to shape the merits.
To say that this summary power has pervasive implications for the
regulatory process and for the conduct of the business of the regulated
companies is not necessarily to suggest that its exercise should be cur-
tailed or that it should be subjected to a greater measure of judicial
surveillance because of its potential for misuse. Evidence abounds
for the proposition that full-blown rate proceedings are a drain upon
the capacities of the administrative agencies and are very costly.3 Ac-
cordingly, as an a priori matter there is reason to look with some favor
upon a device that, apart from the other purposes that it may serve,
provides a means of disposing of a significant amount of potential liti-
gation without the necessity of plenary proceedings. An attempt to
strike a balance between the danger that the power to suspend will be
abused and the benefits to be derived from a reduction of administrative
litigation requires an appraisal of the system in operation.
Neither the agencies nor the respective industries subject to their
jurisdiction are all of a piece; the system does not work in precisely the
same way in all of the regulatory areas in which it is employed. The
purpose of this Article is to consider the uses of the suspension power,
together with certain closely related matters, as it has been employed
by the principal federal agencies that engage in ratemaking functions;
to offer an appraisal of past performance and results; and to explore the
possibility of introducing certain safeguards and improvements into the
process. The agencies that will be examined are the Interstate
3 To quantify the costs is quite another matter. It may be noted that Professor
Paul W. MacAvoy of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology is engaged in a
series of studies, sponsored by the Brookings Institution, that aims at a comprehensive
analysis of the costs and benefits of the regulatory activities of the Federal Power
Commission. See P. MACAVOY, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FEDERAL POWER CoM-
MISSION (The Brookings Institution Reprint No. 189, 1971).
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Commerce Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the
Civil Aeronautics Board, and the Federal Power Commission.
The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) is examined first
because the power of suspension was initially fashioned by amendments
to the Interstate Commerce Act and because the pertinent provisions of
that statute served as a model for the cognate provisions of later regu-
latory statutes. The ICC also provides a natural starting point because
it has developed settled procedures and because its experience has pro-
duced a substantial body of data. The heavy volume of rate changes
with which it must contend under the present scheme of pervasive regu-
lation is a source of many of its problems.
The history of the Commerce Act provisions 4 persuasively demon-
strates a congressional purpose to confide to the exclusive discretion of
the administrative agency the decision whether to suspend. A study
of the ICC's procedures and performance leads to several conclusions.
In some classes of cases a more effective method of giving notice to
those who may be affected by proposed changes is needed. The Com-
mission should assume a greater burden in screening tariff changes in
areas in which experience has shown that outside intervenors are not
likely to apprise the Commission of the need for investigation. The
Commission should be empowered to issue "stop" orders extending for
an additional twenty days the thirty-day period in which it must decide
the issue of suspension-a suggestion designed to enable it to deal with
the difficult cases on a more informed basis than the existing pressures
of time permit. When it exercises the power to suspend, the Com-
mission should undertake to state as specifically as practicable the
reasons for its action, instead of relying upon the mere recitation of
statutory criteria-a procedural improvement that would provide an
informed basis for a carrier's decision whether to stand on its proposal
in its existing form, and, if it chose to do so, for undertaking to meet
its burden of justification.
The discussion of the remaining three agencies concentrates largely
on those aspects of ratemaking that are distinctive attributes of each
and treats less extensively those facets of their regulatory experiences
that are fairly common to all.
The distinctive feature of the Federal Communications Commis-
sion's (FCC's) common carrier regulation, which principally involves
the Bell Telephone System, is the agency's substantial reliance upon
informal bargaining with the American Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany (A.T. & T.) in advance of filing. This process, which excludes
other parties, avoids both the occasion for suspending rates and the
4 See text accompanying notes 15-37 infra.
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conduct of formal proceedings. There is serious question whether such
negotiations (in which, of course, the agency's chief bargaining tool is
its ability to invoke its formal powers) can be reconciled with the
agency's statutory role as an independent reviewing authority em-
powered to examine and revise carrier-initiated rates. Moreover, the
regulatory approach adopted by the FCC, although expeditious in the
short run, has inhibited the development of an adequate and competent
agency staff, delayed the development of an adequate methodology of
regulation, and resulted in a conspicuous failure to formulate visible
and consistent standards. These deficiencies have become manifest in the
course of the agency's first comprehensive investigation of A.T. & T.,
initiated in 1965 and still in progress.
While the FCC has minimized formal proceedings by working mat-
ters out with the carrier in advance of the filing of proposed tariff
changes, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) has frequently utilized the
device of a "speaking" suspension order to achieve that result. A "speak-
ing" order is one in which the Board, at the time it finds a carrier's pro-
posal suspect, not only suspends the rate change but advises the carrier-
sometimes after consultations between Board members and the carrier-
of the kind of substituted proposal that would be accepted without
interdiction. This procedure recently received judicial scrutiny in
Moss v. CAB,' a case involving general increases in domestic passenger
fares sought by the major trunkline carriers. The Board carried this
tactic to the point of issuing an order of suspension that set forth
what the reviewing court later termed "a complete and innovative
scheme for setting all passenger rates for the continental United
States." 6 It was made plain that rates filed in accordance with the
Board's formula would be permitted to take prompt effect and that
rates not so conforming would be suspended and investigated. The
court of appeals, pointing to the carriers' pressing need for added
revenues, concluded that the "advice" was coercive, not merely advisory,
and that the Board action amounted to a prescription of rates. So
viewed, its order was invalid because there had been no public hearings
and no findings by the Board demonstrating that its formula was con-
sistent with the ratemaking standards of the Federal Aviation Act.7
Analysis of the decision does not lead to the conclusion that an
agency's order of suspension becomes reviewable merely because it ex-
plains-as the regulatory statutes indeed require-the reasons for sus-
pension. A workable distinction can be drawn between an order of
5 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
6 Id. at 899.
749 U.S.C. § 1482(e) (1970).
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suspension that identifies the aspects of a carrier's proposal deemed
questionable and one that seeks to use the agency's power to delay and
deny as a means of inducing a carrier to adopt a proposal fashioned by
the agency.
As noted above, the Moss court observed that the pressures upon
the carriers were well-nigh irresistible because of their immediate reve-
nue needs. It suggested that in such circumstances it would be per-
missible to grant rate relief during the course of a formal proceeding
by an interim order based on interim findings. Existing statutory pro-
visions, however, lack flexibility. An agency has discretion to suspend
in toto or not at all. But there is no provision for the common situation
in which an agency can make a preliminary judgment that a proposal
appears justifiable in part and questionable in part.
An expeditious and satisfactory means of meeting such a situation
would be for Congress to authorize ratemaking agencies to allow partial
and temporary increases, subject to appropriate conditions, at the time
they exercise their power of suspension.
The last agency considered, the Federal Power Commission
(FPC), has not used the power of suspension as a bargaining tool.
Unlike the other regulatory agencies, however, it has had signal success
in settling cases after they have been set down for hearing. This has
been especially notable in pipeline rate cases. Even though these are
invariably multiparty proceedings, settlement of some or all of the issues
was achieved in more than half the cases during the period 1960-1970.
Even when the agreement to settle was not reached until the conclusion
of the evidentiary hearing, the Commission saved much time by dis-
pensing with an initial decision by an examiner and the customary
briefing procedures.
Several factors have played a part. FPC practice requires the
parties to submit and exchange relevant data and expert testimony in
written form at an early stage. The agency's staff plays an active role,
checking data and providing information obtainable through the Com-
mission's resources. Thus negotiation can take place on the basis of a
reliable core of knowledge and with the assistance of the agency's staff.
Moreover, the examiners have frequently been effective in using the
pre-hearing conference to narrow and focus the issues. Not least im-
portant, the methodology and the standards employed in these rate cases
are settled and known. With the results of litigation predictable within
a fairly narrow range, the prospect of agreement by negotiation is con-
siderably enhanced.
A question that recurs in the context of ratemaking is the extent
of an agency's authority to terminate an evidentiary hearing in a rate
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case when there is substantial, but less than unanimous, agreement as
to an appropriate disposition among the principally affected parties.'
The Administrative Procedure Act authorizes procedures for the sub-
mission of all or part of the evidence in a rate case in written form
"when a party will not be prejudiced thereby." ' The provision, how-
ever, has restricted utility because of the inherent difficulty of predicting
results of cross-examination. Determination on the basis of written
submissions should also be authorized, though left to the agency's dis-
cretion, when a substantial majority of those primarily affected by a
rate proposal support an agreement of settlement. In such circum-
stances, the considerations favoring expedition outweigh the speculative
gain that may result from giving a dissident a more extensive right to
pursue trial-type procedures.
II. THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
The Interstate Commerce Act vests in the ICC extensive control
over the rates and charges of regulated companies.' Changes in pub-
lished rates may become effective only after thirty days from the filing
of notice with the Commission." After the filing of any schedule in-
dicating a new rate, or regulation or practice affecting a rate, the ICC
is authorized, either upon complaint or sua sponte, to conduct a hear-
ing.' Pending hearing and decision, the Commission may suspend the
proposed change for a period of time not to exceed seven months beyond
the time when the rate would have gone into effect. The ICC must give
reasons for its suspension. If the proceeding is not completed within
this period, the carrier may put the change into effect. The Commis-
sion, however, may require, in the case of an increased rate for trans-
portation of property, that the carrier maintain records of amounts
collected by reason of such increase and that it refund, with interest, any
portion ultimately found to be unjustified. The statute further provides
that suspension cases shall be given priority and that the burden of
justifying proposed changes shall be upon the carrier.'
3
A failure by the Commission to suspend a rate change does not
immunize a carrier from a subsequent investigation and appropriate
8 See text accompanying notes 225-33 infra.
9 5 U.S.C. § 556d (1970).
10Interstate Commerce Act §6(3), 49 U.S.C. §6(3) (1970), is the provision
relating to rail carriers. Comparable provisions for other types of carriers appear in
id. § 317(c) (motor carriers) ; id. § 906(d) (water carriers) ; id. § 1005(d) (freight
forwarders).
11Id. §6(3).
12 Id. §15(7). Comparable provisions appear in id. §§316(g), 907(g), 1006(e).
is Id. § 15 (7).
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remedial proceedings. The Commission may at any time institute a
proceeding to investigate existing rates and practices, either upon com-
plaint or upon its own initiative. "Any person, firm . . . , assocation
. . . , organization . . . , body politic . . . , or common carrier" may
file a complaint, and the Commission has a duty to investigate if there
appears to be "any reasonable ground" for doing so.14 Under these
procedures, however, the burden of proof falls upon the moving party
rather than the carrier.
A. An Historical Note
The administrative power to suspend a rate pending investigation
into its legality was fashioned in the context of railroad regulation. In
later years, however, Congress consciously adopted the same design in
other regulatory statutes." Accordingly, the history of the Interstate
Commerce Act illuminates the suspension power that is common to the
various regulatory schemes to which this study is addressed. That
history, as indicated below, supports the view that Congress intended
to confide the power to delay the effectiveness of rate changes exclu-
sively to administrative authority and that it regarded the exercise or
nonexercise of that power as a matter fully committed to agency
discretion.
Prior to the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910,1" rates could be challenged
only upon complaint and after they had gone into effect. The Commis-
sion came to regard this as a serious deficiency, particularly during a
period of rapidly rising prices, and beginning in 1907 urged that it be
accorded power to restrain proposed changes while they were under
investigation.'7 Some shippers, the Commission observed, had repaired
to the courts in order to seek injunctive relief pending a Commission
hearing, and this was unsatisfactory on several grounds. 8 The courts,
14Id. §13(1). Comparable provisions appear in id. §§304(c), 907(a), 1006(a).
In addition to seeking prospective relief, the private complainant may also seek
an administrative award of reparations for injuries inflicted by a rail or water carrier.
See id. §§ 16(1), 908(d). If the complaint is filed against a motor carrier or freight
forwarder, the Commission may grant only prospective relief. In order to recover
damages the complainant must proceed by an action at law. See id. §§ 304a, 1006a.
1 5 E.g., Natural Gas Act §4(e), 15 U.S.C. §717c(e) (1970); Federal Power
Act § 205 (e), 16 U.S.C. § 824d(e) (1970); Federal Communications Act § 204, 47
U.S.C. §204 (1970); Motor Carrier Act §§216(g), 218(c) 49 U.S.C. §§316(g),
318(c) (1970); Water Carrier Act § 201, 49 U.S.C. §§907(g5, (i) (1970); Freight
Forwarders Act § 406(e), 49 U.S.C. § 1006(e) (1970); Federal Aviation Act § 1002,
49 U.S.C. § 1482(g) (1970). See also Intercoastal Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C. § 845
(1970).
16 Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539.
17 1 I. SHARFMAN, TE IxTERSTATE COmmERCE CommissioN 49-52 (1931); 21
ICC ANNt. REP. 9-10 (1907); 22 ICC ANN. REP. 10-12 (1908); 23 ICC ANN. REP.
6-7 (1909).
18 23 ICC ANN. REP. 6-7 (1909).
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for one thing, were in disagreement as to their power to consider
charges of illegality that were appropriate for decision in the first in-
stance by the Commission. 9 Moreover, the exercise of jurisdiction by
those courts that assumed the power to act had frequently led to con-
fusion and discrimination. Carriers in some instances were required to
maintain one rate in their published tariffs and to collect another. If
all affected shippers failed to join in the injunctive suit, judicial relief
might run to the complainants but not to other members of the shipping
public. Further complications arose in the case of joint rates because
the plaintiffs might secure jurisdiction over only one of the participating
carriers. Courts often required the posting of substantial bonds as a
precondition to injunctive relief. The judicial remedy was seen not
only as dubious and inadequate but as repugnant to the Commission's
role as the primary and expert arbiter of rate disputes.
Early in 1910, President Taft submitted to Congress his recom-
mendations for improved regulation of rail carriers, which included a
proposal that the Commission be "empowered, in its discretion, to post-
pone the effective date of a rate increase for a period not exceeding
sixty days . ... " " During the protracted legislative proceedings
that followed, a focal issue was the length of the suspension period,
with the Administration continuing to favor a relatively short period
and various insurgents contending that suspension of rate increases
should last until the ICC completes its formal investigation." The
resulting compromise authorized the Commission to suspend for a
period of up to 120 days and, if the hearing could not be concluded
within that time, for a further period not exceeding six months. 2
Significantly, throughout the period during which the amendments
were considered there seems to have been no departure from the
assumption that the Commission would have an unfettered discretion
to determine whether the situation warranted the exercise of the power
to suspend. The representative of the National Industrial Traffic
League, the chief organization of the country's shippers, urged that the
Commission, drawing upon its experience and information, should be
permitted to suspend a rate advance "in its discretion, upon a prima
facie showing," so that "chaos and harassing litigation may be
19 The Supreme Court later expressed its approval of those decisions of the lower
federal courts that disclaimed jurisdiction. Board of R.R. Comm'rs v. Great N. Ry.,
281 U.S. 412, 429 (1930).
20 45 CoNG. RFc. 462 (1910).
21 See 45 CONG. REc. 6409, 6500-01, 6510-11, 6900-01 (1910). Under the Taft
proposal, rate changes other than increases would have been subject to suspension
for a limited period.
22 Mann-Elkins Act § 12, ch. 309, § 12, 36 Stat. 552 (1910).
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avoided." ' The report of the Senate Committee on Interstate Com-
merce states that the Commission "should, in its discretion, be em-
powered . . . to postpone . . . the effective date . . . for a reasonable
period to enable it to investigate the proposed action." 24 Senator
Cummins, a member of the Committee, explained that the proposed
change would enable the Commission to issue "what lawyers will
understand to be in the nature of a preliminary injunction suspending
. . . such rates as it cares to suspend or desires to suspend from going
into effect .... ," 23 Senator Elkins, a principal sponsor of the
legislation, likewise explained that the bill would confer "the dis-
cretionary power to suspend." 26
The legislative history also lends support to the view that the "in-
junctive" power accorded the Commission was designed as a substitute
for any equitable powers that the courts might possess, rather than as
a supplement to those powers. As observed above, the President's
recommendation that Congress authorize an administrative power to
suspend was responsive to the Commission's expressed concern that
resort to the courts had proved troublesome. The National Industrial
Traffic League echoed the suggestion that the Commission was "better
able to determine the equities of the case than the courts, their entire
study being one of transportation." 27 Comments of influential legis-
lators indicate, moreover, that the arguments as to the appropriate
length of the suspension period were premised upon the assumption that
when the period expired there would be no obstacle to putting the rates
into effect even though the Commission's investigation might be un-
completed.2 Proponents of a short period of suspension argued that
prolonged delay would be unfair to the railroads, as they could not
recover losses incurred during the period of suspension even though
an increased rate might ultimately be approved.29 Those who con-
tended for a longer period warned of shifting an undue share of the
burden to the public.30 Neither group, it would appear, contemplated
that when the period of suspension terminated, the question of interim
relief might simply be shifted to the courts. During consideration of
23 Hearings on Bills Affecting Interstate Commerce Before the House Interstate
& Foreign Commerce Comm., 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 437 (1910) (testimony of James
C. Lincoln).
24 SENATE COMsN!. ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE, COURT OF CommERCE, S. REP. No.
355, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 9 (1910).
2545 CONG. REC. 6500 (1910).
2645 CONG. REc. 3472 (1910).
2 T Hearings on Bills Affecting Interstate Commerce Before the House Interstate
& Foreign Commerce Comm., 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 438 (1910). See also id. 445.
28 See 45 CoNG. REc. 6782-83, 6787, 6916-17, 8370, 8387 (1910).
2945 CONG. Rrc. 3472, 4109-10, 6503, 6509, 6782, 6787-88 (1910).
3045 CONG. REc. 3373-75, 6500-01, 6510-11, 6900-01 (1910).
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those provisions of Mann-Elkins that created the short-lived Commerce
Court, Senator La Follette did offer an amendment that would have
permitted that court, in certain circumstances, to enjoin rate changes
pending a final determination by the ICC. That amendment, however,
was defeated.3 1
In the comprehensive Transportation Act of 1920, two changes
were made in the existing provisions for tariff suspension. If a carrier
put an increased freight rate into effect after expiration of the sus-
pension period, but before the conclusion of the Commission's investiga-
tion, the ICC was authorized to order it to keep account of all amounts
collected by reason of the increase and to refund with interest the
portion of the increase found not justified. Congress also reduced from
ten months to five months the maximum period for which the Com-
mission might suspend.32 In 1927, the Commission informed Congress
of its inability to make the necessary investigation and determination of
rate cases within the five-month suspension period, and Congress re-
sponded by lengthening the maximum permissible period to seven
months, the point at which it currently stands33
Neither the history of the 1920 act nor that of the 1927 act pro-
vides any basis for altering the conclusion derived from the examination
of the Mann-Elkins Act that the decision whether to suspend a given
tariff was intended to be exclusively an administrative prerogative, dis-
cretionary with the Commission.
The main course of judicial decisions points the same way. It has
been definitively settled that the courts have no independent authority
to delay the effective date of a change in rates and that the only in-
junctive power is that delegated to the agency.3 4 The cases uniformly
support the proposition that the agency's initial determination to sus-
pend or refrain from suspending is ordinarily unreviewable3  There
3145 CONG. REc. 7260-64 (1910).
32 Ch. 91, tit. IV, § 418, 41 Stat. 487 (1920).
33 49 U.S.C. § 15(7) (1970).
3 4 Arrow Transp. Co. v. Southern Ry., 372 U.S. 658 (1963). In Arrow the
railroads had substantially reduced rates on grain, and the Commission had suspended
them for the maximum statutory period. When the ICC failed to reach a decision
within the 7-month period and the 5 succeeding months (during which the rail
carriers voluntarily refrained from putting them into effect), the railroads announced
that they would proceed to put the proposed rates into effect. A competing barge
line thereupon sought injunctive relief from a federal district court, alleging that if
the new grain rates were put into effect, it would be driven from business before the
Commission concluded its inquiry into their validity. Affirming the decisions of the
lower courts, the Supreme Court ruled (3 Justices dissenting) that § 15 (7) of the Act
conferred upon the Commission the sole and exclusive power to suspend the operation
of new rates.
3 5 Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. v. Chesapeake & 0 Ry. 441 F.2d 483 (4th Cir.
1971); National Indus. Traffic League v. United States, 28 F. Supp. 129 (D.D.C.
1968), aff'd per curiam, 393 U.S. 535 (1969); Movers & Warehousemen's Ass'n v.
United States, 227 F. Supp. 249 (D.D.C. 1964); Long Is. R.R. v. United States,
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has been a difference of opinion, however, on the question whether a
Commission order vacating a previous suspension may be judicially
examined for abuse of discretion. 6 Moreover, there has been some
recent intimation that courts may look upon certain exercises of the
suspensory power as sufficiently extraordinary to warrant intervention. 7
B. Procedure
The ICC has had long experience with the power of suspension,
and, dealing with an immense volume of tariff publications annually,8
it provides a principal source of data for appraisal of the suspension
process. Before turning to a consideration of performance and results,
it will be useful to outline briefly the ICC suspension procedures.
193 F. Supp. 795 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. United States, 179 F.
Supp. 605 (D. Del. 1959), vacated as moot, 364 U.S. 280 (1960); National Water
Carriers Ass'n v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Carlsen v.
United States, 107 F. Supp. 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Algoma Coal & Coke Co. v.
United States, 11 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Va. 1935); M. C. Kiser Co. v. Central of Ga.
Ry., 236 F. 573 (S.D. Ga. 1916), aff'd, 239 F. 718 (5th Cir. 1917); see Municipal
Light Boards v. FPC, 40 U.S.L.W. 2243 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 14, 1971) (agency's decision
to suspend a major rate increase for 1 day, rather than the full 5 months allowed
by the Federal Power Act, is an unreviewable exercise of discretion).
As some of these decisions point out (especially Long Is. R.R. v. United States,
193 F. Supp. 795, 799-800 (E.D.N.Y. 1961)), a quite different question would be
presented if the case were one in which the agency had failed to follow a clear
statutory command or limitation, e.g., had suspended for a period beyond the per-
mitted 7 months. Similarly, Ferguson-Steere Motor Co. v. United States, 126 F.
Supp. 588 (N.D. Tex. 1954), indicates that an order to suspend would be defective
if unaccompanied by a statement of reasons, but holds that the court will not look
behind a "boiler plate" statement of reasons.
38 Amarillo-Borger Express, Inc. v. United States, 138 F. Supp. 411 (N.D. Tex.
1956), vacated as moot, 352 U.S. 1028 (1957), holds that once the agency has made
an explicit determination that a rate should be suspended, it may not reverse that
determination on reconsideration without providing an adequate explanation. Accord,
Atlantic Coast Line PR. v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Va. 1958); Dixie
Carriers, Inc. v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 844 (S.D. Tex. 1956), vacated as moot,
355 U.S. 179 (1957); Long Is. R. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 823 (E.D.N.Y.
1956). Other courts have refused to follow Amarillo-Borger, reasoning that a
vacation of a suspension order after reconsideration is not unlike a refusal to suspend
in the first instance. See, e.g., Naph-Sol Ref. Co. v. United States, 269 F. Supp.
530 (W.D. Mich. 1967); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 977
(W.D. Wis. 1967); Freeport Sulphur Co. v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 913
(S.D.N.Y. 1961).
Clearly there is a much stronger basis for judicial review when an agency's
decision to terminate the rate proceeding takes place at a more advanced stage, e.g.,
after a hearing before an examiner has been conducted. See Wisconsin v. FPC,
373 U.S. 294 (1963); Minneapolis Gas Co. v. FPC, 294 F.2d 212 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
In such circumstances, the Supreme Court declared that "the issue is whether the
termination constituted an abuse of discretion .... " Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U.S.
294, 308 (1963).
37 See text accompanying notes 155-80 infra for a discussion of Moss v. CAB,
430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
38 A tariff publication may consist of a single page or run to hundreds of pages.
Some contain rates, rules and regulations affecting the rates, and the measure of
service provided thereunder. Others are free of rate quotations, containing only rules
and regulations, classification ratings, and routing and other provisions that govern
the rate tariffs. One or more of the tariff adjustments contained in a tariff publication
may be considered for suspension.
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Since 1952 the Commission has delegated to a board of employees,
the Suspension Board, authority to make the initial determination. 9
When a tariff change is filed, the Board, which consists of five mem-
bers 40 and has a supporting staff, 41 may enter an order of investigation
and suspension, initiate an investigation without suspension, or decline
to take action.
As observed above, a tariff publication must be filed thirty days
before the proposed effective date. Of necessity, therefore, the Board
must do its screening rapidly. In practice, it devotes almost all of its
attention to those tariff filings eliciting protest from shippers or com-
peting carriers.' Under the Commission's rules, protests and requests
for suspension normally must be filed with the Commission and served
upon the publishing carrier no less than twelve days before the effective
date of the tariff." The protestant is called upon to specify the basis
of his objection and to indicate what he would consider a satisfactory
alternative.44 The protest is regarded as one "addressed to the dis-
cretion of the Commission," and is not deemed a formal complaint.45
The carrier may submit a reply, but must file and serve it at least three
full workdays prior to the effective date of the rate change to assure its
consideration by the Board. The Board normally votes three days in
advance of the effective date.
Proceedings before the Board are "informal;" 4" no subpoenas will
be issued, nor will a transcript be made. 7  If the Board declines to sus-
pend a proposed tariff change, the protestants may seek reconsideration
of the decision by Division Two of the Commission.48 This request
must reach the Commission no later than two workdays prior to the
effective date of the protested matter.49 When the Board votes to sus-
39 The delegation was made pursuant to § 17(2) of the Interstate Commerce Act,
49 U.S.C. § 17(2) (1970).
40 The members of the Board have had extensive experience in transportation
matters, in both private and public employment. They are not lawyers.
41 At present, the supporting staff consists of 34 employees, including clerical
personnel. At one time, the staff was approximately 25% larger.
42 See text following note 62 infra.
43 49 C.F.R. § 1100.42 (1971) (Comm'n Rule 42). If the Commission has granted
the carrier leave to file a change on less than 30 days notice, the protest must be
received not less than 5 days prior to the effective date. Telegraphic protests are
permitted. Id.
44Id.
45 Id. The rules further declare that if a protestant desires to "proceed further
against a tariff or schedule which is not suspended, or which has been suspended and
the suspension vacated, a separate later formal complaint or petition should be filed."
Id.
4 6 Id. § 1100.200(a).
47Id.
48 Division 2 has been designated the appellate division for all matters relating
to suspension. Id. §1100.200(b).
491d. § 1100.200(c).
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pend, however, the time requirements are less stringent. The affected
carrier may file a petition to vacate the order within twenty days. 0
This period also applies to petitions seeking reconsideration of a
Division Two order altering a decision of the Suspension Board.5'
C. The System in Operation
Performance is in part a function of volume. In fiscal 1970 more
than 300,000 tariffs were filed with the ICC, a fifty-percent increase
over comparable figures of a decade earlier. Approximately ninety-five
percent of these were freight tariffs; passenger and express traffic ac-
counted for the balance. Of the freight tariffs, more than 193,000 were
filed by motor carriers (common and contract), and upward of 81,000
by rail carriers. The remainder comprised approximately 11,000 filings
by freight forwarders, 3000 by water carriers, and 1100 by pipelines."2
In the same year, the Commission considered for possible suspen-
sion some 4088 "tariff adjustments." An adjustment, in the Commis-
sion's lexicon, is any change in one or more tariffs that raises a discrete
issue. Of the 4088 adjustments, 4 the ICC considered only 259,
slightly more than six percent, on its own initiative. The remaining
3829 cases resulted from the filing of protests." The adjustments in
question were reflected in 11,137 tariff publications (one adjustment
may appear in several publications of the carrier or its traffic agent).
Comparing the latter figure to the more than 300,000 tariff publications
filed that year, it appears that an average of only one in twenty-eight
was considered by the Commission for suspension. 6
The action taken in fiscal 1970 on adjustments involved in the
Commission's deliberations is shown by the following table.
Old. § 1100.200(b) (1).
51 Id. § 1100.200(b) (3).
52 The statistical picture for the past decade (fiscal years 1961-1970 inclusive)
is set forth in Appendix A. For these and most of the other data set forth in this
section, the author is indebted to the ICC's staff and particularly Mr. George Hilton
of the Suspension Board.
S3 Thus, if in connection with a single commodity, a carrier proposed a 5%
increase in the charge for carriage, and modifications of the relevant minimum and
detention charges, there would be 3 adjustments appropriate for Commission con-
sideration. A carrier-proposed 5% general increase in all its existing rates would
constitute 1 adjustment.
54 These adjustments involved 525 changes by rail carriers, 3394 by motor carriers,
58 by water carriers, 96 by freight forwarders, and 15 by express and pipeline com-
panies. Statistics for the fiscal years 1961-1970 inclusive are set out in Appendix B.
55 See 84 ICC ANN. REP. 41-42 (1970).
56 Data for the full decade 1961-1970 are shown in Appendix C. As indicated
therein, the percentage of tariff publications considered for suspension ranged from
2.5% to 4.5% of the total number of publications.
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TABLE 157




Rail Motor Water warder line Totals cent
Suspended in full 284 1,371 2 45 2 1,704 41.7
Suspended in part 24 30 0 0 0 54 1.3
Not suspended
(permitted to






by carriers) 45 827 10 11 3 896 21.9
Totals 525 3,394 58 96 15 4,088 100.0
As may be noted, 896 proposals were disposed of prior to their effective
date and in advance of action by the Commission. Almost half of these
were withdrawn by the carriers.58
The ICC does not maintain statistics summarizing the results of
cases in which it has decided that a formal investigation is warranted.
A survey conducted approximately a decade ago, however, showed that
during a twelve-month period, a decision on the merits was required in
only seventeen percent of the cases (285 of 1663 "investigation and
suspension" proceedings).59 In the remainder, the suspended rate was
withdrawn, or the carrier failed to defend it at a hearing. In more than
two-thirds of the contested cases, the Commission determined that the
challenged adjustment was unlawful in whole or in part. Thus, in well
over ninety percent of the cases in which the Commission exercised its
57 84 ICC ANN. R a. 41 (1970).
Of the 4088 adjustments considered by the ICC, 2062 involved increases, 1774
reductions, 194 both increases and reductions, and 58 neither one. Protests numbered
5038: 3454 were from shippers and receivers, 1518 from competing carriers, and 66
from government agencies. Id.
Actions taken on adjustments considered for suspension during the years 1961-
1969 are shown in Appendix B. Data respecting protests filed in those years appear
in Appendix D.
58 The number of voluntary cancellations per calendar year is shown in Appendix
E.
59 The survey discussed in the text was conducted in connection with an unpub-
lished study of ICC rate proceedings made by Professor Roger C. Cramton in 1961
for the Committee on Rulemaking of the Administrative Conference of the United
States.
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suspension power, the carrier's proposal was ultimately abandoned or
disapproved.6"
Two recent samplings of suspended rates made in conjunction with
the present study 6 and summarized in the following tables indicate
that the picture is substantially unchanged. They show that a substan-
tial majority of the proceedings never reach the hearing stage, and that
only a small fraction of those adjustments suspended by the Commis-
sion take effect as proposed.
TABLE II
DISPOSITION OF MOTOR INVESTIGATION AND SUSPENSION PROCEEDINGS
INSTITUTED IN THE PERIOD FROM DECEMBER 20, 1968,
THROUGH FEBRUARY 4, 1969
Suspension vacated and schedules permitted to become
effective without hearing .................... 1
After hearing, tariff found not unlawful and permitted
to become effective ......................... 3
After hearing, tariff found not just and reasonable and
required to be cancelled ..................... 7
Tariff voluntarily cancelled by carriers prior to hearing
or ordered to be cancelled because of failure to
defend at hearing .......................... 89
Total ................................ 100
TABLE III
DISPOSITION OF RAIL, WATER, FREIGHT FORWARDER, EXPRESS, AND
PIPELINE INVESTIGATION AND SUSPENSION PROCEEDINGS
INSTITUTED IN THE PERIOD FROM NOVEMBER 26,
1968, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 20, 1969
Suspension vacated and schedules permitted to become
effective without hearing ..................... 7
After hearing, tariff found not unlawful and permitted
to become effective .......................... 2
After hearing, tariff found not just and reasonable and
required to be cancelled ...................... 8
Tariff voluntarily cancelled by carriers prior to hearing
or ordered to be cancelled because of failure to de-
fend at hearing ............................. 33
Total ................................. 50
60 d.
61 Based upon an examination of Suspension Board files.
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As is evident from the preceding discussion and the supporting
appendices, 2 in a typical year ninety-six to ninety-seven percent of the
tariff publications filed with the ICC become effective by virtue of
nothing more than the passage of time. Only three to four percent are
characteristically involved in those adjustments considered for suspen-
sion. Members of the Suspension Board acknowledge that their atten-
tion is devoted almost exclusively to those items that have generated a
protest. It is true that in 1970 the Board considered sua sponte 259 ad-
justments-of a total of 4088 considered. These 259, however, were the
product of a routine and cursory examination of certain tariffs that had
as its sole object spotting those publications containing one of several
species of restrictive provisions regarded as prima facie discriminatory.3
Apart from this limited category, the prospect that a tariff will be con-
sidered for suspension has depended entirely upon the likelihood of an
initiative from outside the Commission.
Question immediately arises as to the extent an agency can rely
upon the self-interest of those entitled to protest as a device for alerting
it to those matters that warrant its consideration. Certainly, tariff
changes that have a broad impact upon commercial interests will
rarely escape the prompt attention of shippers, receivers, and competing
carriers. Results are less certain, however, where the adjustment is
of a lesser order. The adverse effects of a minor adjustment may be
confined to a limited number of small shippers. Unless these shippers
patronize a watching service or are members of a shippers' organization
that maintains a watch on tariff publications, they may learn of a tariff
change that has significant consequences for them only after it has taken
effect. At that point the forces of inertia are heavily with the carrier,
as the burden has shifted to the shippers. They can force the issue only
if prepared to file a formal complaint and to incur the costs involved in
presenting an evidentiary case challenging the legality of the new rate.64
That is rare.
Even if one assumes, as the Commission implicitly does, that com-
mercial interests will alert it to those changes in freight tariffs that
warrant scrutiny, a further question is presented with respect to tariff
changes affecting passengers. A check reveals that, when the change
62 See Appendices A, B.
63 Four or 5 employees are engaged in this screening process, which was insti-
tuted in 1967 at the suggestion of Commissioner Walrath, Chairman of Division 2.
When the Suspension Board encounters one of the suspect provisions, it requests the
carrier to submit a justification. (Based upon conversation with Suspension Board
members.)
64 Although the Commission can initiate a proceeding in its own right, it is apt
to respond to a suggestion that it do so only when the matter has obvious and general
importance. Ordinarily, it will remit the party to his option of filing and pursuing
a formal complaint.
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is one affecting commuter service by rail or motor, protests are regu-
larly filed, and the matter is considered for suspension." In the case
of tariff changes affecting long-haul passenger service, however, the
response is sporadic. Apparently in that area the economic effect upon
individuals is too diluted to stimulate the effort.
Of those adjustments that the Commission actually considers
for suspension, how adequate is the information upon which it acts, and
what standards does it employ? Carriers and protestants frequently
provide little more than conclusory statements by way of justification
or objection. Perhaps this is not surprising in view of the large number
of changes that are constantly being made in the rate structure for
competitive and other reasons. The Suspension Board does seek to
encourage more pointed presentation and the submission of relevant
data, but with small success. The combination of heavy volume and
wide variety makes it difficult to prescribe standardized requirements
and forms, and, for the most part, little has been attempted along these
lines!"8 The Board does, of course, make some use of the facilities and
data of the Commission. 7  Moreover, Board personnel sometimes dis-
cuss the matter informally (usually by telephone) with the carrier or its
agent and obtain added information in that way. A conversation can
pinpoint the area of the Board's concern, and it is reasonable to assume
that on occasion it prompts a withdrawal and the filing of a modified
substitute.0 8 It appears, however, that members of the Suspension
65 Protests are commonly received from individual commuters, commuter groups
and organizations, and towns and cities. (Based upon conversation with Suspension
Board members.)
66 A recent exception should be noted. On April 7, 1971, the Commission issued
an order prescribing new procedures applicable to the filing of general increases by
designated tariff publishing agencies (rate bureaus) on behalf of their motor common-
carrier members. Details, including various limitations upon the application of these
requirements, are set forth in Fxc Parte No. MC-82, New Procedures in Motor Carrier
Revenue Proceedings, 339 I.C.C. 324 (1971). For present purposes, it suffices to
say that the object is to require the affected rate proponents to submit, in a convenient
and uniform way, the cost and traffic data that the Commission regards as necessary
to an expeditious and informed judgment whether the proposal is justified. The
detailed requirements have not been made more widely applicable because of the
recognition that their satisfaction would entail substantial cost.
67 For example, in a case involving an increase by an individual carrier, the
Board might seek information from the Commission's cost-finding section concerning
the relevant territorial averages.
08 On very rare occasions, Division 2 of the Commission has entered a "speaking"
order of suspension, i.e., one that invites a modified substitute. An example is an
order entered in Increased Rates and Charges, Middle Atlantic Conference, Interstate
Commerce Comm'n, I. & S. Docket No. m-24549, Dec. 31, 1970, in which the Com-
mission first suspended various 8% rate increases but then added:
It is further ordered, That respondents be, and they are hereby, author-
ized to establish upon not less than 1 day's notice in lieu of the suspended
rates and charges, new increase in rates and charges of six percent applied
in the same manner as the increases suspended herein . . ..
For another example, see Increased Rates and Charges, The Alaska Railroad, Inter-
state Commerce Comm'n, I. & S. Docket No. 8604 (Sub No. 1), Order of Mar. 15,
19711
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Board do not regard it as their function to suggest modifications to the
carriers or to seek settlement of disputed matters by inviting those
carriers to withdraw their proposals and to file substitutes.
In sum, it seems fairly evident from files and from statements of
Board members that the Board, heavily pressed by the volume of
business and the restraints of a tight schedule, is often required to act
on information that is sketchy at best. In these circumstances, the
Board almost inevitably tends to place substantial reliance upon its
"feel" for the matter and its sense of the Commission's preferences and
predispositions on issues of transportation policy.69
The nominal test to which the Suspension Board and Division Two
subscribe is that which is customary among the regulatory agencies:
whether there is probable cause to believe that the proposal, if made
effective, would violate the Act. 0 Suspension orders of the ICC do not
attempt to articulate the reasoning that leads to the conclusion that a
violation would probably result. The statement of reasons is in-
variably a paraphrase of the statute -- for example, that schedules
appear to be unjust and unreasonable, in violation of the Interstate
Commerce Act; unjust and unreasonable, in violation of the Interstate
Commerce Act, and constitute unfair and competitive practices in
contravention of the national transportation policy; unduly prejudicial
and preferential, in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act; or un-
justly discriminatory, in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act."
To ascertain what lies behind such generalizations, the affected parties
1971. Cf. Algoma Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, 11 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Va.
1935); Birmingham Slag Co. v. United States, 11 F. Supp. 486 (N.D. Ala. 1935).
The use of similar technique is discussed more fully in text accompanying notes
155-80 infra.
69 When it considers an appeal from a refusal to suspend, Division 2 ordinarily
acts on the information gathered by the Board. According to the sampling of 1500
suspension actions taken in 1960-1961, note 59 supra, protestants appeal in approxi-
mately one-third of the cases in which the Board declines to act.
In instances in which a carrier petitions Division 2 for reconsideration of a
previous suspension, the Division is apt to have the benefit of some argument and
information that it did not have when it first acted. As shown by the discussion
above, text accompanying notes 45-49 supra, there is only a 3-day interval between a
Board decision to refuse suspension and the Division's determination of an appeal
from that determination. Petitions to vacate a suspension, however, are timely if
filed within 20 days; thus there is more time to supplement the file. Petitions to
vacate are filed in approximately one-tenth of the cases in which a rate investigation
is ordered.
One further datum from Professor Cramton's 1960-1961 sampling is of interest.
Division 2 disagreed with the Suspension Board, in whole or in part, in almost 30%
of the cases in which there was an appeal from an order refusing to suspend, or a
petition to vacate a suspension order, The percentages were roughly the same in
both categories of determinations.
70 The statute does not require any statement when suspension is declined, and
none is issued.
71 This is equally true whether the action is that of the Board or Division 2.
72 Based upon examination of Suspension Board files.
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can do no better than read Commission decisions in formal cases-
themselves not always notable for their clarity-and indulge in more-
or less-informed speculation.
As appears from Table I above,73 in more than half the cases that
came to a vote 7' in fiscal 1970 the result was an order of suspension."
Most suspended schedules, however, are voluntarily withdrawn by the
carrier or are ordered cancelled because of the carrier's failure to defend
at a hearing.76  In a striking proportion of the cases, when the Com-
mission exercises its summary power to suspend pending formal in-
vestigation, an investigation never takes place and litigation is avoided.
There are several explanations for this. In some instances, the
proposed change is rather unimportant from the carrier's point of view.
The publication may be one filed primarily to accommodate a particular
shipper, and its acceptance or rejection by the Commission may be of
little moment to the carrier.7 In other instances, the proposal may be
one designed to serve a short-run purpose; a suspension automatically
defeats that objective. Finally, and most importantly, the proponent of
a change must weigh two factors against the gain that he anticipates
would result if the proposal were put into effect: the costs of presenting
a formal case and the chances of a favorable decision on the merits in
the face of an agency finding of probable cause to suspend. This
calculus will often lead to the conclusion that the odds are unfavorable
and that it would be better to try another tack.
D. Conclusions and Recommendations
It may well be, as more than a few critics have urged, that the
scope of regulation of surface transportation should be drastically nar-
rowed, and the standards and objectives redefined. This Article, how-
ever, is directed to the Commission's use of specified powers within the
73 Table in text accompanying note 57 supra.
74 Typically, about 10% of the adjustments that come under consideration are
voluntarily withdrawn in advance of action by the Suspension Board. See Appendix
E. Roughly an equal number may fail to reach the voting stage because the schedule
is rejected for a legal defect or because the protest is withdrawn. See id.
7 5 For the entire decade 1961-1970, it appears that slightly more than one-half of
the adjustments voted upon were suspended. See grand totals set forth in Appendix
B. The difference between 1970 and the average for the preceding 9 years is accounted
for largely by the high rate of suspension in rail cases in 1970 (284 suspended, 172
not suspended). In the years 1961-1969, the rate was far lower. It has been con-
sistently high in motor carrier cases, in which the number "suspended" exceeded the
number "not suspended" in every year of the decade except 1966, when the figures in
the 2 categories were fairly close. Appendix B.
7 6 Tables in text following note 61 supra.
7 7 In some instances publications are withdrawn upon the filing of a protest
without the carrier even awaiting action by the Suspension Board. Some of these are
matters that are doubtless of small concern to the carrier.
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framework of its existing regulatory responsibilities. Given that
premise, it is apparent that the Commission must continue to rely
heavily upon the initiative of protestants in exercising its authority to
suspend and investigate. A thorough examination of all of the tariff
publications filed annually with the ICC would require a staff of experts
and factfinders many times the size of the staff now devoted to those
matters. There is little reason to favor such an expansion of adminis-
trative activity. The self-interest of competitive carriers and of re-
ceivers and shippers provides adequate incentive to bring to the agency's
attention most of those matters that warrant its serious consideration.
So viewed, the problem is one of identifying and addressing the limita-
tions and deficiencies.
Two weaknesses have been noted. The system does not work well
when the impact of particular tariff adjustments is largely confined to
small and unorganized shippers who are apt to learn of the adverse
effects only after the rates have become effective. The imperfections
of the system are also evident in the field of long-haul passenger service:
those affected are unorganized, and their economic interest as individ-
uals is small even though that interest is far from insubstantial in
the aggregate.
An increased degree of self-organization by such groups is a theo-
retical possibility but one not easily achieved, and the Commission is
ill-equipped to promote such a development. It is, however, specifically
empowered for good cause to modify statutory requirements "in respect
to publishing, posting and filing of tariffs .... " 78 It could require
public notification by means more efficacious than mere filing of the
change with the Commission. For example, the agency might fashion a
rule requiring that in specified classes of cases the carrier publish notice,
in summary form, in one or more newspapers having general circulation
in the relevant geographic area.
Beyond this, the Commission should assume a greater burden of
screening proposals in circumstances in which experience has shown
that outside intervention is undependable. This would, indeed, require
additions to staff personnel, but hardly on an inordinate scale. In light
of the responsibilities with which it is charged, the ICC now does re-
markably little on its own initiative. Five employees are currently
engaged-and they not uninterruptedly-in checking tariff publications
to ascertain whether they contain one of several types of restrictive
provisions that the Commission regards as suspect. This is an absurdly
meager undertaking when one considers that the Commission is charged
with oversight of the rates of rail carriers, motor carriers, water car-
78 49 U.S.C. § 6(3) (1970).
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riers, pipelines, and freight forwarders. A modest increase in the staff
attached to the Suspension Board, perhaps twenty additional employees,
would permit the agency to make reasonably adequate preliminary in-
vestigations in selected areas of its jurisdiction that are now largely
ignored.79  This examination would not be confined to a check for
particular suspect provisions but would seek to ascertain, by the use of
Commission resources and by appropriate inquiries, whether a proposal
raises questions sufficiently serious to warrant further exploration by
the Suspension Board.
If the first area of concern is the matter of identifying the proposed
rate changes that call for consideration, the second is the task of gather-
ing the relevant information and making a reasoned disposition. In
this the pressures of time play a critical role."° A ready but less-than-
satisfactory answer to the problem posed by these often acute pressures
would be to rewrite the statutory provisions governing exercise of the
suspension power to provide for longer waiting periods-such as sixty,
instead of thirty, days-before a change might be made effective. This
would provide the agency with a better opportunity to decide whether
the circumstances warranted the fairly drastic measure of imposing a
prolonged suspension. To require a sixty-day wait in every case, how-
ever, is unnecessary and would impose a heavy cost. Flexibility is an
important value from the standpoint of carriers and shippers alike. A
doubling of the waiting period would make more rigid the pricing
structure, which, as matters now stand, is widely regarded as sluggish
in its responsiveness to market conditions. It would inhibit the non-
controversial change as well as the disputed one.
Nonetheless, in some instances the Commission now meets its
deadline only by acting without the benefit of adequate information
from the proponent and the protesting parties, through a deliberative
process that has excessive components of haste and hunch. Although
the decision whether to suspend is necessarily a summary one, and its
7 9 Numerous proposals looking to the creation of a consumers' advocate are now
pending before Congress. E.g., H.R 10,835, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). It is
doubtful, however, that such an agency, if it were created, would be well-equipped
to exercise the detailed surveillance that could be expected of an expert staff exclu-
sively devoted to an examination of tariff publications of surface carriers. Members
of the Commission's staff have ready access to all of the resources of the agency.
A representative of consumers could, however, play an important role in the rate
cases that go to formal hearing. This is especially true in ICC cases because the
Commission does not ordinarily assign members of its staff to participate in the
hearing process, but relies almost entirely upon private parties and intervenors to
explore the issues raised by proposed rate changes.
It appears that this much may indeed occur. The House bill was passed in an
amended form on October 14, see 117 CONG. REc. H 9558-82 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1971),
and sent to the Senate.
so The tight schedule imposed upon the Board by the deadlines for filing protests
and replies exacerbates the normal pressures. See text accompanying note 43 supra
& following note 45 supra.
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object is a determination of "probable cause" rather than a final adjudi-
cation, the effects of these preliminary determinations are far from
negligible. A decision to suspend means not only that the effectuation
of the proposal is substantially delayed; it also imposes the necessity of
formal and costly proceedings. As earlier observed, a common conse-
quence is abandonment of the proposal. On the other hand, a decision
to refrain from suspending in a case in which the proposal actually calls
for further scrutiny may have serious consequences for those dependent
upon the carrier's service.
What is needed is a device that will leave the thirty-day waiting
period intact for the run of cases, but will permit the agency to delay
effectiveness for an additional brief period in those hard and exceptional
cases in which it finds it cannot intelligently act without further investi-
gation and deliberation. To this end, the agency should be empowered
to issue a "stop" order delaying for a brief additional period-twenty
days is suggested-the date when a tariff schedule would otherwise
become effective.8 Such a stop order would reflect nothing more than
an agency determination that it required more time to decide whether
its power of suspension should be exercised. 2 During the period
covered by the stop order, the agency, the carrier, and other affected
parties would have opportunity to focus on the matter at hand in a
far more productive manner than is feasible under present procedures.8 3
The Interstate Commerce Act, as well as the various statutes
modeled after it," requires that the Commission, when it suspends a
schedule, note in the official record and deliver to the affected carrier
81 Arguably, such stop orders could be issued under existing statutory authority.
49 U.S.C. § 6(3) (1970), which imposes the requirement that no change shall be
made by a carrier on less than 30 days' notice, also contains the following language:
Provided, That the Commission may, in its discretion and for good cause
shown, allow changes upon less than the notice herein specified, or modify
the requirements of this section in respect to publishing, posting, and filing
of tariffs, either in particular instances or by a general order applicable to
special or peculiar circumstances or conditions ....
The Commission, however, has long interpreted this language to permit modifications
of filing requirements for the purpose of shortening the notice period, but not as
authorizing a lengthening of the period. This seems correct. Read in context and
in light of a history that reflects a congressional purpose to place a fixed limit upon
the period that the Commission might delay a carrier from effectuating a change, see
text accompanying notes 15-37 supra, it is at least doubtful that the courts would
uphold an administrative modification of the requirements of § 6(3) along the lines
of the suggested stop order procedure. Caution would dictate a request for explicit
statutory authorization. But see text accompanying note 96 infra (describing the
recent action of the Federal Communications Commission, modifying the ndtice
requirements imposed by the Communications Act).
82 If the power to suspend is likened to the power to grant a preliminary injunc-
tion, issuance of a stop order might be analogized to the issuance of a temporary
restraining order.
83 The stringent time limitations now governing protests, replies, and agency
action are discussed in text accompanying notes 43-51 supra.
84 Statutes cited note 15 supra & accompanying text.
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"a statement in writing of its reasons for such suspension . . . .))
There is nothing in the relevant history to suggest that Congress con-
templated judicial review of orders of suspension, and a great deal of
evidence suggests the contrary.86 The fair inference is simply that
Congress believed that there was some utility in having the Commission
make known to the affected parties the reasons for its exercise of sum-
mary power.87 There would be a considerable practical gain if the
Commission implemented this directive by stating its grounds in a way
that was informative rather than ritualistic.
A tariff publication typically contains a number of elements. Com-
mission dissatisfaction with one or more of these could lead to a decision
to suspend. If the statement of reasons consists merely of a broad
generalization, for example, that the schedule appears to be unjust and
unreasonable, in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act, the carrier
can only guess at the particular source of the Commission's concern.
One practitioner who is legal counsel for a major carrier stated that his
company would file substitute schedules ninety percent of the time, if it
knew why its original proposals had been suspended. 8 Not knowing,
the company often decides to drop a proposal altogether or, on occasion,
to litigate the matter at a formal hearing. Asked whether he couldn't
find out what was on the agency's mind by sounding out a member of
the staff, his reply was that "they don't usually talk to us that freely."
If the Commission's orders of suspension would identify and ex-
plain, to the extent practicable, what it is that the agency finds objec-
tionable, or potentially so, the proponent obviously would be in a much
better position to respond: to abandon the proposal, or particular
features of it; to withdraw the pending proposal and submit an ap-
propriately modified version that might pass muster; or to go forward
with an awareness of the issue or issues that would have to be litigated
85 49 U.S.C. §§15(7), 316(g), 907(g), 1006(e) (1970).
88 Text accompanying notes 15-37 supra.
87 The legislative history provides little direct evidence of Congress' purpose in
requiring a statement of reasons. One of the principal witnesses at the hearings, the
representative of the National Industrial Traffic League, did express the view that,
during a period of suspension, modifications of the carrier's proposal might be worked
out "possibly with the advice and aid of the Commission in bringing out the facts."
Hearings on Bills Affecting Interstate Commerce Before the House Interstate &
Foreign Commerce Comm., 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 444 (1910). Representative Town-
send, sponsor of the administration's bill in the House, explained the language calling
for a statement of reasons by analogizing it to the requirement that courts set forth
their reasons for issuing restraining orders and temporary injunctions, apparently
believing that it would serve a notice-giving function. Id. 439.
88 Based upon personal interviews by the author of individuals who do not wish
to be identified. (Not all practitioners interviewed put the point that strongly, but
none doubted the general validity of the observation.)
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to the agency's satisfaction.89 To be sure, specificity requires more of
an effort, and there are limits to what one can reasonably expect from
a summary process. An agency engaged in determining preliminarily
whether it ought to maintain the status quo pending the conduct of a
further proceeding, is not yet prepared to make detailed findings on the
merits. Yet it is not unreasonable to ask for something more than a
standardized paraphrase of the statute. If the agency did no more than
identify with particularity the areas of its concern, there would be a
significant gain. Doubtless there are cases in which it is difficult to do
even that because of the constraints of limited time and heavy volume.
The "stop" order procedure described above is designed for such cases.
The requirement that an order of suspension state the agency's
reasons in writing can serve an important purpose-that of providing
meaningful notice to the proponent of the tariff change and to those
who would be affected by it. If that purpose is fulfilled, the power to
suspend would become more than a device for providing interim pro-
tection when there is probable cause to question the validity of a pro-
posal; it would also provide a means of eliminating some controversies
and narrowing others-in either event, moving matters to a more
expeditious conclusion.
III. THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
The common-carrier provisions of the Communications Act of
1934 follow closely the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act out-
lined above." For present purposes, the principal difference is that the
maximum period of suspension is three months,"' rather than seven.
There is also a wide divergence in the volume of tariff schedules filed
with the two agencies, although recent developments in telecommunica-
tion-changing technology and new services-have caused some in-
crease in the activities of the FCC's Common Carrier Bureau. 2  As
89 The failure to narrow the issues at the threshold by a meaningful statement of
the reasons for suspension is compounded by the apparent reluctance of most ICC
examiners to use the prehearing conference order as a clarifying device.
90 Filing requirements appear in § 203 of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C.
§ 203 (1970); provision for suspension pending hearing appears in § 204, 47 U.S.C.
§ 204 (1970) ; authorization of rate investigations upon the Commission's initiative or
upon complaint appears in § 205, 47 U.S.C. § 205 (1970); provision for the filing of
complaints appears in § 208, 47 U.S.C. § 208 (1970).
9149 U.S.C. § 204 (1970).
92 The number of tariff publications filed with the FCC is far smaller. The FCC,
however, does not maintain its records in a way that permits one to gather statistics
as to the number of filings by any convenient method. As one would expect, some
changes in schedules involve major rate changes and major new services. Most
changes, however, are routine and rarely controversial. These may involve such
matters as new items of station equipment in the private line services, changes in
rate centers, extensions of telephone service through new mobile radio stations, and
revisions in the directory of telegraph offices. Letter of FCC Chairman Dean Burch
to Administrative Conference of the United States, Apr. 2, 1971, copy on file in
Biddle Law Library, Univ. of Pa. Law School.
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of May 1971, thirty-five formal proceedings were being processed by
the Domestic Rates Division of the Bureau.9 3  Of these, the largest
share was initiated by complaint, and only a minor fraction by issuance
of an order of suspension.
Two recent procedural steps taken by the FCC are worth notice. 4
First, the Commission now requires that, in the case of major rate
increases, the carrier submit, contemporaneous with the filing of the
new schedule, the essential data on which it relies as justification for
the change. In this connection, the Commission has stated that the
prescribed information with respect to revenue-cost relationships is
essential to a determination whether the rate is prima facie valid and
should be permitted to take effect without suspension.". Secondly, the
Commission prescribed a rule extending from thirty days-as set by
the statute-to sixty days, the period of time by which notice must
precede a rate increase.9" This was necessary in the Commission's
view "to afford the public and the Commission sufficient time to
evaluate tariff filings." 17 Even though the volume of tariff filings is
far lower than with the other agencies, the difficulty of gathering ade-
quate information and appraising it within a short span of time appears
to be common to all of the ratemaking agencies in the exercise of their
summary powers.
The FCC experience differs materially from that of the ICC in
that it has heavily relied in the ratemaking process upon a technique
sometimes described-perhaps euphemistically-as "continuous surveil-
lance." In describing this process, the chairman of the FCC observed
that
it is customary for representatives of the carriers to discuss
[tariff] filings with the staff of the Commission in advance
of the filing in order to iron out any difficulties which may
appear. These procedures operate to minimize the number
93 Despite its title, the Domestic Rates Division handles a number of cases
involving matters other than rates, such as jurisdiction, interconnection of facilities,
and billing practices.
94The changes are set forth in the Final Report and Order in The Matter of
Amendment of Part 61 of the Commission's Rules relating to Tariffs and Part 1
of the Commission's Rules relating to Evidence, 25 F.C.C.2d 957 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Final Report].
95 Id. 965-66.
906The Commission finds its authorization for this change in 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)
(1970), which states that "the Commission may, in its discretion and for good cause
shown, modify the requirements [of notice] in particular instances or by a general
order applicable to special circumstances or conditions." Id. Its order notes that
the Communications Act does not contain words of limitation such as those found
in the Interstate Commerce Act. Final Report, supra note 94, 25 F.C.C.2d at 970;
see the language of 49 U.S.C. § 6(3) (1970) relating to "changes upon less than the
notice herein specified" quoted in note 81 supra.
9
7 Final Report, supra note 94, 25 F.C.C,2d at 971-72.
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of instances where suspension and formal investigation be-
come necessary.9
The process of holding informal meetings and conferences to
determine in advance by tacit agreement those changes in tariffs that
should be initiated, is one which has developed in the course of the
Commission's relationship with the American Telephone & Telegraph
Company. A.T. & T. is, of course, far and away the agency's principal
'"client" among common carriers. The Bell system embraces twenty-
three Bell operating telephone companies, the Western Electric Com-
pany, which manufactures most of the equipment utilized by the op-
erating companies, and the Bell Telephone Laboratories.9 It provides
more than eighty percent of the country's telephones, and it accounts
for more than ninety percent of all intercity transmission."00 It also
provides the lion's share of radio and television transmission facilities.
Its revenue from interstate telephone tolls alone was more than $4.9
billion for the twelve-month period ending January 31, 1971.101
A.T. & T. has been directly and importantly involved in virtually every
major common-carrier proceeding that the Commission has conducted
since the passage of the Communications Act of 1934. Doubtless, it
was the very magnitude and complexity of the task of regulating the
Bell system that initially led the FCC to the technique of informal
supervision and negotiation. By this practice comprehensive formal
investigation was avoided for many years.
10 2
On only one occasion has this procedure received more than
cursory examination in the courts, in Public Utilities Commission of
California v. United States."'0 Reference to that opinion and record
provides a fair description of the process. Believing, on the basis of
reports regularly received from A.T. & T., that the level of earnings
on interstate telephone service might be excessive, the Commissioners
9 8 Letter of FCC Chairman Dean Burch to Administrative Conference of the
United States, Apr. 2, 1971, copy on file in Biddle Law Library, Univ. of Pa. Law
School.
99 A.T. & T. owns all of the stock of most of the operating companies, a majority
of the stock in 5 of them, and minority interests in 2 others. It owns all of the
stock of Western Electric. A.T. & T. and Western Electric jointly own Bell Tele-
phone Laboratories. See AMERICAN TETEI'HONE & TELEGRAPH COMPANY, 1970
ANNUAL STATISTIcAL REPORT.
100 See American Tel. & Tel. Co., Charges for Interstate and Foreign Communi-
cation Service, 9 F.C.C.2d 30, 38-39 (1967).
101 The source of this datum is A.T. & T.'s administrative reports to the Domestic
Rates Division of the FCC.
102 The practice of conducting informal meetings between communications carriers
and the Commission to discuss interstate rates is noted in 3 FCC ANN. REP. 91
(1937) and in 6 FCC ANN. REP. 30 (1940).
103 Public Util. Comm'n of Cal. v. United States, 356 F.2d 236 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 816 (1966).
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and staff members of the Common Carrier Bureau met informally with
representatives of the Bell system on six different days during July,
September, and October of 1964. The Commissioners listened to
presentations by Bell officials, Commission staff members, and several
outside consultants. The presentation took the form of unsworn testi-
mony, and various supporting charts and exhibits were submitted. The
participants also made opening and closing arguments. A transcript of
the proceedings was maintained.' Thereafter, the Commission met
further with Bell officials to discuss questions raised by the various
presentations. In November 1964, the Commission issued a public
notice "stating that the Bell System companies would submit tariffs
proposing major reductions in interstate telephone rates amounting to
approximately 100 million dollars annually." ' The notice declared
that the reduction was "made possible by the high level of business
activity and increasing efficiencies in telephone operations." 1"6 The
notice did not purport to make findings concerning the appropriate rate
of return to be allowed Bell on its interstate operations; nor did it ex-
pressly state that the proposed rates would be just and reasonable.
Thereafter, the California Public Utilities Commission, on behalf
of the ratepayers of that state, requested a rehearing in the matter of
the meetings that had been held, to consider the interstate earnings of
the Bell System, arguing that the closed proceedings had denied it the
opportunity to be heard and that the Commission had failed in various
ways to discharge its ratemaking responsibilities. 1°7  The FCC "dis-
missed the petition for rehearing on the principal ground that 'The
Public Notice . . . did not and could not bind anyone to any action,
nor was it a ruling on the proposed tariff filing.' " 1s The State Com-
mission then turned to the court of appeals, urging it to remand the
10 4Id. at 238. It is evident from this description that by 1964 the informal
meetings with A.T. & T. had become somewhat formalized. In the early years,
the meetings were more on the order of ordinary round-table bargaining sessions.
105 Id.
106 Joint Appendix filed with Court of Appeals at 2-3, Public Util. Comm'n of
Cal. v. United States, 356 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1966).
107 The California Commission subsequently contended before the court of appeals
that:
FCC has approved or prescribed such rates supposedly to yield a reason-
able return without finding what the return is or should be, or on what
property it is earned, or the operating expenses attributable to interstate toll,
or whether such expenses are reasonable, or whether the rates it has pre-
scribed or approved are reasonable.
Opening Brief for Petitioner at 15, Public Util. Comm'n of Cal. v. United States,
356 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1966).
108 356 F.2d at 238. The FCC also stated that the State would be free to file
a complaint challenging the reasonableness of the proposed rates when they were filed.
Id. at 240. To this the California Commission replied that the vital proceeding had
already been held and the FCC was seeking to shift to the appellant investigative
responsibilities that the agency alone was equipped to fulfill. See id. at 240-41.
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proceedings with directions to the FCC to issue notice, to hold public
hearings with full opportunity to interested parties to be heard, to make
findings in accordance with the ratemaking provisions of the Act, and
to enter an order prescribing just and reasonable rates. In the court's
view, the case "boil[ed] down to the question whether the rates an-
nounced in the Commission's Public Notice were carrier-made or
Commission-made . . . . " ' The court's answer was that the Com-
mission's actions fell short of approval or prescription of the proposed
rates, and that the appellant's only remedy would be to lodge a complaint
with the federal agency if those rates were filed and if the FCC did not
choose to initiate a formal investigation of them.10
One may examine the technique of informal negotiation described
above by posing several somewhat related questions. What are its
practical advantages and disadvantages compared to a procedure that is
open and adversary? Is it consistent with the design of the regulatory
scheme enacted by Congress? Did the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit correctly rule in Public Utilities Commission of California that
the matter was beyond its reach? Perhaps consideration of the last of
these questions is best postponed until the discussion of the ratemaking
procedures of the Civil Aeronautics Board."' Those procedures were
subjected to judicial scrutiny in Moss v. CAB," 2 and the opinion in that
case, if it is not irreconcilable with the Ninth Circuit's holding, cer-
tainly reflects a sharply different judicial attitude.
Since the FCC consistently employed its informal approach to the
Bell system until 1965, one naturally turns to that prolonged experience
in seeking to arrive at a practical judgment, although it should be
acknowledged at the outset that the verdict of those who have observed
the FCC's performance is a divided one. The obvious virtue of a
bargaining process is that it offers the prospect of a more expeditious
solution than the conduct of a formal case. Members of the Commission
have long defended it on this ground. Former FCC Chairman Rosel
II. Hyde echoed this view in describing the development of this pro-
cedure at a congressional hearing:
One of the first projects of the newly created Federal
Communications Commission in 1934 was an investigation
of the telephone industry, which was a very broad investi-
gation in respect to all of its operations.
But, before it was concluded, the Commission resorted to
negotiations in order to make immediately available the
109 Id. at 239.
"OId. at 240.
111 See text accompanying notes 141-93 infra.
112 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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changes in rates and regulations which the investigation in-
dicated might be appropriate. And, as a result of that investi-
gation, the Commission adopted a policy, not an exclusive
policy, but a pretty general policy of trying to maintain a
system of continuous regulation that would keep abreast of
changes from year to year rather than have the Commission
resort to tremendous hearings which could last several years
and which could delay-or which could end up at a time when
the conditions which prompted the investigation might not be
current.1
3
It has also been argued that, as a consequence of arrangements
that it has made for the reporting of information and data, the FCC
"has at its disposal at all times a veritable fluoroscope of Bell telephone
system operating performance." 114 The author of this claim, the
editor of Public Utilities Fortnightly, has also stated that "judging by
results accomplished" the FCC's "continuous surveillance" has been a
marked success."' Writing in 1963, he observed that during the
period of regulation some fifty changes in rates had been negotiated
with Bell; that most of these involved reductions; that "[i]nterstate
long-distance telephone rates today [1963] are nineteen per cent lower
than they were in 1940, even though prices generally have more than
doubled;" and that "[1]ong haul calls have benefited even more from
rate reductions." 11 Others, including a number of congressmen, have
been more skeptical of the benefits produced by the FCC's bargaining
process.
17
The agreement of the Bell system to numerous reductions during
the period between 1940 and the mid-sixties in-and-of-itself proves
little. Technological developments had opened the way to some
spectacular cost savings. One Commissioner observed in 1967 that the
then current cost of transmitting a telephone message by high-capacity
microwave relay towers was "about 1 percent of the cost of moving it
113Hearings on Antitrust Problems of the Space Satellite Communications
System Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust & Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 290-91 (1962).




117 See Hearings on Antitrust Problems of the Space Satellite Communications
System Before the Subcomin. on Antitrust & Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 282-83, 292-93, 698-757 (1962) ; Hearings on
S. 2814 (Communications Satellite Legislation) Before the Senate Comm. on Com-
merce, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 79-96 (1962) ; Hearings on a Progress Report of Federal
Communications Commission Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 8 (1963).
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by conventional telephone line 30 years ago." 118 Moreover, the tele-
phone industry is one of markedly declining costs, and long-distance
circuits were operating far below the level of saturation throughout the
period in question. Reductions in rates tapped the elastic demand for
long-distance service, stimulating the volume of business to a degree
that produced constant improvement in earnings." 9 There is thus
reason to believe that A.T. & T., behaving as a rational monopolist un-
regulated by federal authority, would have made reductions no less
substantial than those to which it acquiesced in its conferences with
the FCC.
118 American Tel. & Tel. Co., Charges for Interstate and Foreign Communication
Service, 9 F.C.C2d 30, 133 (1967) (Comm'r Johnson concurring).
319 The FCC initiated a comprehensive formal investigation of A.T. & T. in
1965. Its 1967 decision disposing of the first phase of that investigation found in
part that:
324. The Commission's staff submitted for the record certain operating
reports supplied by A.T. & T. which contain interstate earnings ratios and
other selected operating statistics for the years 1955 through 1966. A staff
witness also presented testimony and exhibits with respect to trends in selected
interstate operations for the period since 1955.
325. The record clearly shows that there has been a consistent and sub-
stantial growth in interstate messages, revenues, and average revenue per
message over the past decade. It also shows that this growth has more than
offset the depressing effect on earnings of increases in investment and ex-
penses, including wage increases. During the past 10 years the interstate
earnings ratio has increased more than one percentage point (from 6.9 percent
for 1957 to 8.2 percent for 1966 on the company's basis of computation)
notwithstanding three major reductions in interstate message toll telephone
rates (in 1959, 1963, and 1965) and two major revisions in separations pro-
cedures (in 1962 and 1965) which increased interstate revenue requirements.
During this period, the average annual increase in messages was 8.4 percent
and revenues from all interstate services increased at an average rate of 10.6
percent per year. This rate of growth in revenues, coupled with a lower
average increase in expenses and taxes of 9.9 percent, resulted in an average
annual increase in net earnings, as reported by A.T. & T., of 13.9 percent.
Since the average annual increase in net investment was only 12 percent
during this period, the resulting earnings ratios improved substantially over
this span of years. None of the foregoing growth figures are adjusted to
reflect the effect of the aforementioned rate reductions and revisions in the
separations procedures and, therefore, do not reveal the full extent of the
upward trend in interstate earnings. If such adjustments were made, the
indicated growth in earnings would be substantially higher.
326. Another factor in the growth trends is the stimulating effect on the
volume of business resulting from the interstate message toll telephone rate
reductions during this period. The record shows that there was an accelera-
tion in the rate of growth in messages starting in 1964. This acceleration in
the rate of growth in messages was coincident with the substantial reductions
in interstate message rates in 1963, when the "after 9" rates were introduced,
and in 1965, when the $100 million reduction in rates became effective. Since
the evidence introduced in this phase of the proceedings does not include an
analysis of the stimulating effect of these rate reductions, we will not attempt
to assess, in this interim decision, the effects of such rate reductions on
message volume and interstate earnings. However, on the basis of the record,
we are of the opinion that the long-term trend of improving interstate earn-
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The suggestion that the Commission's staff has been in a position
to observe every heartbeat of the Bell system is ludicrous. The re-
sources of the Common Carrier Bureau have ordinarily permitted it to
devote annually approximately five or six man-years to examination of
Bell's activities. To this date the Bureau lacks an adequate staff of
economists. 20 Over the years it has had relatively few lawyers skilled
in the regulation of public utilities. The paucity of its resources has
made the Bureau extremely dependent upon A.T. & T., a company
equipped with an impressive array of professional and technical talent.1"'
It is true that the company submits a large body of information and data
to the agency. The significance of the submissions, however, turns in
large part upon the validity of the underlying premises and assumptions.
For example, the "facts" that ostensibly reflect the cost of providing
interstate telephone service depend, among other things, upon the
method of allocating a variety of joint costs between interstate and
local service. Different methods will produce widely divergent re-
sults.' The theoretical and practical problems involved in allocating
costs between different types and classes of service for purposes of
120 When the Commission has instituted formal proceedings, it has been obliged
to rely heavily upon outside consultants retained for the occasion.
121 At the conclusion of the first phase of the FCC's formal proceeding involving
the A.T. & T. system, Commissioner Johnson spoke to the problem of regulating the
Bell system:
The FCC's Common Carrier Bureau (which carries prime responsibility
for the Commission's telephone regulation) is staffed with able and dedicated
men. But there are only 100 professionals in the Bureau, and they must also
bear the burden of overseeing Western Union, numerous other communica-
tions common carriers, all American-based international communications com-
panies, and administration of the Communications Satellite Act. The contrast
between the Bureau's task and its resources speaks for itself.
Indeed, lack of resources is an even more serious problem for State and
municipal regulatory bodies. And the splintering of jurisdiction between the
Federal Government and the States undoubtedly contributes further to the
deterioration of effective, coordinated regulation. A.T. & T. is so much
bigger, and better financed, than any government agency it confronts that
even the process of selecting which information it will offer the regulator
gives the whole operation a substantial aura of self-evaluation.
9 F.C.C.2d at 137 (concurring opinion).
122 An illustration is provided by the Commission's disposition of one aspect of
the "separations" question (allocating equipment values between Federal and State
jurisdictions) considered in its 1967 A.T. & T. decision. One of the numerous
elements in an exchange plant is known as "subscriber plant"--telephone instruments
and lines to the local office. An allocation based solely upon use would have put
4% of the value of subscriber plant in the interstate rate base. That is to say,
during the period of actual use, the average telephone is utilized 4% of the time for
interstate long-distance calls. Bell, however, for various reasons, proposed a formula
that would have allocated 15.67 of this item to the interstate base. The Commission
determined that the allocation should be 12%. The difference between the 2 rates
increased the interstate rate base by $85,000,000. See id. at 128-29.
On October 27, 1970, the Commission concluded a subsequent proceeding that
had reopened the whole question of jurisdictional separations. Separation Procedures,
26 F.C.C.2d 248 (1970). Its decision adopted a new formulation, shifting approxi-
mately $130,000,000 from the intrastate, to the interstate, telephone ratemaking base.
Id. at 260 (Comm'r Johnson dissenting).
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designing rates are no less severe. Commissioner Nicholas Johnson
has correctly observed that the process by which the Bell system has
provided information to the Commission has "a substantial aura of
self-evaluation." =
Subsequent developments must be considered in appraising the
accomplishments of the fifty-odd rate negotiations conducted by the
FCC with Bell prior to 1963. In 1963, the FCC completed what might
be considered its first formal rate investigation of major proportions,
a proceeding designed to determine the lawfulness of the tariff schedules
of A.T. & T. and the Western Union Telegraph Company, covering
so-called "private line" telephone and telegraph services. 4 The Com-
mission concluded, following extended hearings in which the users
vigorously participated, that A.T. & T. had substantially underpriced
services that were competitive with Western Union and was charging
excessive rates for the noncompetitive services. It decided to prescribe
a drastically altered rate design that would produce reasonable earnings
at approximately the same level for all of A.T. & T.'s private line
services.2 5
Not until 1965 did the Commission initiate a comprehensive in-
vestigation of A.T. & T." 6 Again, it noted a wide variation in earnings
among various services. Among the issues designated for considera-
tion were separations procedures, i.e., allocation of joint costs; operating
costs, including particularly the reasonableness of prices paid by Bell
operating companies to Western Electric for equipment, supplies, and
service; fair rate of return; and the design of rates for the various types
of services offered to Bell's customers. The then Chairman, Commis-
sioner Henry, noted that "the widely divergent rates of return earned
by the various services" of A.T. & T. raised serious questions that
required full exploration; that disagreements as to a separation formula
had been persistent but had generally been settled "so to speak, out of
court;" and that questions involving the earnings and prices of Western
Electric "remain largely unexplored in depth." There was need, he
concluded, for a "broad-gauged" public hearing that would expose the
123 9 F.C.C2d at 137.
124 A.T. & T. and Western Union Private Line Cases, 34 F.C.C. 217 (1963).
Private line services are valuable to users having specialized or bulk communication
requirements on a scale that makes it economical to lease facilities. Established
users include the General Services Administration, stock exchanges, and the press.
Private line services accounted for about 2% of A.T. & T. revenues at the time of
the proceeding.
12 5 1d. at 301.
126 American Tel. & Tel. Co., 2 F.C.C.2d 871 (1965). In denying reconsideration
of the order directing a formal investigation, the Commission stated pointedly that
it was not repudiating continuous surveillance and intended to use the method again
"under appropriate circumstances." American Tel. & Tel. Co., 6 P & F RADIO REG.
2D 662, 666-67 (1965).
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entire subject of the FCC's relationship with the Bell system to "the
critical, searching spotlight of public scrutiny." 12"
A phase of the comprehensive investigation was concluded in 1967,
at which point the Commission modified its separation formula "~ and
decided that the rates of the operating companies should be reduced to
produce a substantially lower rate of return (in the range of seven to
seven and one-half percent) on the interstate rate base. 29 Issues of
rate design were left open.' 30 The question of the accuracy of
A.T. & T.'s costs as reflected by the prices paid to Western Electric-
its major supplier of equipment-remains untouched to the present
day.'
3 1
For many years the FCC used the threat of invocation of its formal
powers as a means of avoiding their actual employment. A.T. & T.,
for its part, has been more than willing to substitute negotiation for
adversary proceedings. When the FCC initiated a comprehensive
formal proceeding in 1965, the company protested that the Commission
ought not abandon the tried and true, and the agency replied that it
was not permanently discarding the informal approach.!3" If "con-
tinuous surveillance" has been successful in the sense that negotiations
characteristically have resulted in prompt agreement, it has also had
serious defects and limitations. Informal settlement-the easy way-
has had its costs, and, if those costs were once somewhat hidden, over
the course of time they have become increasingly evident. The regu-
latory agency has conspicuously failed to overcome its considerable
dependence upon the regulated company. It has failed to develop a
staff with some semblance of the size, skill, and strength requisite for
its formidable task of understanding and coping with the myriad and
complex problems of regulating the country's largest and most impor-
127 Amerian Tel. & Tel. Co., 6 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 662, 668-69 (1965)
(concurring statement of Chairman Henry).
128 American Tel. & Tel. Co., Charges for Interstate and Foreign Communication
Service, 9 F.C.C.2d 30 (1967).
129 In November 1970, A.T. & T. filed proposed tariff changes calling for in-
creases in long-distance telephone rates. The increases are predicated in part upon
a claim that the company should be allowed a 9.5% rate of return. They were
suspended by a Commission order dated January 21, 1971. 27 F.C.C.2d 149 (1971).
130 Proceedings involving the design of rates are pending, and the Commission
has called for expedition. Id. at 161.
131 Id. at 169-170 (Comm'r Johnson concurring). The prolonged failure of the
Commission to confront issues relating to Western Electric is also discussed in Note,
The Federal Communications Commissioa and the Bell System: Abdication of Regu-
latory Responsibility, 44 IND. L.J. 459 (1969). The magnitude of the issue is sug-
gested by the fact that Western Electric's sales to Bell operating companies amounted
to more than $4.9 billion in 1970. 1970 WEsTER ELcmTic ANN. REP. 13.
132 American Tel. & Tel. Co., 6 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 662, 666-67 (1965).
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tant monopolistic enterprise. Obtaining what it regarded as concessions
from the company, the agency continued to postpone from year to year
and decade to decade confrontation with the hard questions.13 At its
best, the regulatory process develops visible and coherent principles of
decision, particularized criteria and standards, and a competent meth-
odology." Only when this has taken place do proceedings go forward
within predictable channels; only then do they become more manageable
and less protracted. The FCC's technique of invisible decisionmaking
by informal bargaining has long delayed such a development. As a
result, regulation proceeds even now at a pace of gasp and halt.
It also appears inconsistent with the scheme of the regulatory
statutes under consideration to carry informal procedures to the lengths
that they have been taken by the FCC in the practice of "continuous
surveillance." There is no doubt of the propriety, indeed the desir-
ability, of opening and maintaining free channels of communication
between the agency and the regulated company. Informal procedures
will often be better adapted to securing information, identifying prob-
lems, and exploring matters of present or potential concern. It would
seem quite appropriate for a commission staff to make preliminary
investigations, by whatever informal means are convenient, to ascer-
tain whether a regulated company is obtaining disparate earnings
from its various classes of service. It would likewise be eminently
reasonable, if inequities in the rate design became apparent, to request
the company to initiate remedial changes. It is quite another matter,
however, for the Commissioners to meet with company officials to
negotiate rates that the company would be prepared to propose and
133 As indicated above, the Commission has yet to resolve some questions, relating
to the Bell System, that are basic in the process of conventional ratemaking. Not
surprisingly, it has also failed to address itself to less conventional questions-
questions relating to such matters as efficiency, innovation, and quality of service.
134 The point that informal bargaining does not lead to such a development does
not imply that principles and standards can only emerge through the conduct of
adjudicatory-type hearings. In some instances, rulemaking may be an effective com-
plement. See FPC v. Texaco Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964) ; American Airlines, Inc. v.
CAB, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966). The functions
of adjudication and rulemaking "merge at many points," NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon
Co., 394 U.S. 759, 770 (1969) (Black, J., concurring), and one commentator has
recently and persuasively urged that the agencies, within the limits of their dis-
cretion, should "fashion hybrid or conglomerate procedural devices which would
utilize those characteristics of both adjudication and rulemaking that are most appro-
priate in light of the circumstances and issues of the particular case." Clagett,
Informal Action--Adjudication--Rule Making: Some Recent Developments in Federal
Administrative Law, 1971 DuxE L.J. 51, 70.
For its current investigation of domestic passenger fares, instituted by Order
70-1-147, Jan. 30, 1970, the CAB has divided the complex and massive proceeding
into 10 phases. It has conducted certain phases, for example, the treatment of flight
equipment depreciation, leased aircraft, and deferred federal income taxes, by notice
of rulemaking. Other phases such as passenger load-factor standards applicable to
fare determinations and the level and structure of passenger fares have been the
subject of extended evidentiary hearings.
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the Commission prepared to accept. 3 ' It is fundamental in the various
federal ratemaking schemes that rates are to be established initially by
the carrier or utility and that the Commission, acting in the exercise of
an independent judgment, is then to employ its powers of visitation,
review, and correction.' The regulatory agency cannot simultaneously
function effectively as an independent reviewing authority and as a
participant in the negotiation of the proposal under examination. If an
agency uses the weight of its reserved powers in a bargaining process
with a carrier, other persons who may be affected by the result are
effectively excluded, even though the regulatory statutes contemplate
that they will be afforded an opportunity to be heard in instances in
which governmental authority is being brought to bear.'8 7  It is true
that aggrieved persons may file a complaint when the regulatory com-
mission refrains from exercising its powers of suspension and investi-
gation. In such instances, however, they will bear the burden of proof
and must be prepared to "go it alone." 138 This is a particularly un-
inviting prospect when it appears that the agency has in effect prejudged
the matter.
Conclusions
"Continuous surveillance," as practiced by the FCC, is a misnomer.
The Commission has had little mastery of the subject matter it purports
to scrutinize. Its technique of proceeding by informal consultation,
doubtless prompted at the outset by the formidable dimensions of its
task, has tended to perpetuate the agency's dependence upon the Bell
System's technical and professional experts. As a result, the Com-
mission has been slow to build an adequate staff, develop an inde-
pendent expertise, and articulate the basis of its decisionmaking. The
slow pace at which it has proceeded with its first comprehensive investi-
gation of A.T. & T., initiated in 1965, largely reflects these deficiencies
rather than any inherent defects in formal administrative processes.
In the long run, regulation by a system of decisionmaking that
fails to explain itself is bound to engender public distrust. That this
135 It is doubtless true that when the FCC and A.T. & T. sit down in advance
of a filing to "iron out any difficulties" neither becomes technically bound by the
understanding reached. Nonetheless, the understanding reflects the agency's informal
determination, to which the agency is, as a practical matter, committed.
136 See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332,
339-43 (1956); Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry., 284 U.S. 370,
383-87 (1932).
137 Thus, the Communications Act provides that when the Commission suspends
a new rate it shall conduct a "full hearing." 47 U.S.C. § 204 (1970). So too, when
it conducts a rate investigation on its own initiative, the Commission shall afford
"full opportunity for hearing." Id. § 205.
1
3 8 See text accompanying notes 108-10 supra.
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did not occur on a more serious scale in the case of the FCC's common-
carrier regulation is attributable to the failure, until 1970, of A.T. & T.
to seek overall increases in its charges. But, the halcyon days that
enabled the FCC to announce from time to time, with fanfare, that Bell
was about to reduce long-distance telephone charges are past. The
proposed tariff changes filed by A.T. & T. on November 20, 1970, were
designed to produce the biggest dollar increase in earnings ever sought
by a regulated company.'39
To question the FCC's approach is not to argue for an artificial
separation of those who represent the agency from those who speak for
the company. Exploration by informal exchange of information and
views is a practical necessity. To be sure, it is not always easy to mark
the precise place at which exploration leaves off and disposition be-
gins. 4 If, however, the Commission were to accept the thesis that
has been presented here-that its form of "continuous surveillance" is
in effect decisionmaking and should be abandoned both because it is
ungoverned by discernible principle and inconsistent with the statutory
scheme-it would face no exceptional problem in avoiding the appear-
ance, as well as the reality, of invisible decisionmaking. The first and
139 Assuming no change in the volumes and composition of messages projected
for 1971, the proposals would have resulted in increased revenues of approximately
$760 million annually. The company estimated, however, that the increased revenues
would amount to $385 million because of shrinkage (reduced volumes because of higher
rates), shifts (the shifting of calls to a time period when lower rates prevail), and
reclassifications (use of a class of service, e.g., customer-dialed in lieu of operator-
handled calls, carrying lower rates). The schedules were designed to encourage
customers to use the network during off-peak periods and to place calls without
operator assistance when feasible. It was further estimated that the rate revisions
would reduce costs by about $160 million in 1971. On these assumptions, the increase
in earnings before taxes would be approximately $545 million. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 27 F.C.C.2d 151, 152 (1971).
The Commission's response to this filing provides an illustration of the use of
informal processes in a manner quite consistent with the performance of the agency's
responsibilities. By letter of January 12, 1971, the FCC requested the company to
postpone voluntarily the effective date of the tariffs filed pending the outcome of an
expedited hearing. It also granted special permission to' the company to file for
interim increases that would produce not more than $250 million. The Commission
indicated that the interim increases would be permitted to take effect after a brief
period of suspension, but would be subject to an accounting order with provision for
refund. The company complied with the request, and the Commission suspended the
revised increases for a 1-week period. The net result was that the company was
authorized to collect without significant delay a portion of the total increases sought.
The customers' interests are protected by the accounting order that accompanied the
suspension. While the Commission has made an interlocutory determination that the
balance of convenience favors allowing a portion of the proposed increases to take
effect without imposing the maximum period of suspension, it has made no commit-
ment as to the extent of the increase that it may ultimately find justified. Id. at 154.
140 See Phillips v. SEC, 153 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 860 (1946),
in which the court concluded that conversations between SEC personnel and the
president of a company involved in a proceeding under the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, § 11(e), 15 U.S.C. §79k(e) (1970), were not shown to have
prejudiced the cause because "the Commission . . . did not hold itself bound by any
of the preliminary steps, but gave the final judgment upon its view of the law . . .
and in the exercise of a discretion which appears rational and reasonable." 153 F.2d
at 32.
[Vol.120:39
SUSPENSION POWER OF FEDERAL AGENCIES
principal step would be to cease scheduling private en banc conferences
with the industry's bargaining representatives and to delegate to staff
the performance of the essential groundwork involved in the ratemaking
process.
IV. THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
As in the case of communications, the statutory provisions for the
economic regulation of the air carrier industry in the Federal Aviation
Act 11 are patterned on the Interstate Commerce Act. Several differ-
ences should, however, be briefly noted. The maximum period of
suspension is 180 days beyond the date when a tariff change would
otherwise go into effect. The Board lacks power to provide for
refunds in the situation in which a rate is put into effect following
expiration of the suspension period but prior to completion of the
administrative proceeding.1 In handling complaints, the Board ap-
pears to have a somewhat broader discretion than the agencies previ-
ously discussed.'
Although the Board does not collect statistics on the number of
rate filings submitted, it is evident that the volume is but a small fraction
of that received by the ICC?' Some basis for comparison is provided
141 Provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 were re-enacted in the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958. Filing requirements are set forth in § 403, 49 U.S.C.
§1373 (1970). Provisions for suspension, investigation, and complaint appear in
§ 1002, 49 U.S.C. § 1482 (1970).
142 In this respect it is unlike Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act, 47 U.S.C.
§204 (1970) (rail carriers), and the Communications Act, 49 U.S.C. § 15(7) (1970),
but similar to Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act (motor carriers), 49 U.S.C.
§316(g) (1970). The Federal Aviation Act also corresponds to the motor carrier
portions of the Interstate Commerce Act, in that it omits any provision authorizing
the agency to award reparations for past excessive charges. See T.I.M.E., Inc. v.
United States, 359 U.S. 464, 478-80 (1959).
14a Compare § 13(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 13(1) (1970),
and § 208 of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 208 (1970), with § 1002(a) of the
Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1482 (a) (1970). Under all 3 provisions "any
person" may file a complaint charging violation of the relevant statute. Each addi-
tionally provides in substance that, if the complaint is unsatisfied by the carrier, it
shall be the duty of the agency to investigate if there appears to be any "reasonable
ground" for doing so. Section 1002(a), however, unlike the other sections cited,
goes on to provide that whenever "the Board is of the opinion that any complaint
does not state facts which warrant an investigation or action, such complaint may
be dismissed without hearing." 49 U.S.C. § 1482(a) (1970). The courts have given
some weight to this additional language, although they have also made it clear that,
at least in some circumstances, the discretion conferred is less than absolute. See
Trailways of New England v. CAB, 412 F2d 926 (1st Cir. 1969) ; Transcontinental
Bus Sys., Inc. v. CAB, 383 F2d 466 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920
(1968) ; Nebraska Dep't of Aeronautics v. CAB, 298 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1962). See
also Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. CAB, 350 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 945 (1966).
144 Data and estimates appearing in this paragraph were obtained from the Board
in response to inquiries by the author and are confirmed by letters received from
Whitney Gillilland, Vice Chairman (Apr. 20, 1971), and Alfred R. Stout, Chief,
Passenger and Cargo Rates Division, Bureau of Economics (June 25, 1971), copies
on file in Biddle Law Library, Univ. of Pa. Law School.
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by the Board's issuance in 1969 and 1970 of a total of 104 suspension
orders,' 45 compared to the issuance of more than 3300 by the ICC
during the same period.'46 The Board estimates that fewer than five per-
cent of those filings subject to suspension are in fact suspended.' 7 Dur-
ing 1969 and 1970 approximately ninety percent of those tariffs that
were suspended were later withdrawn by the filing carrier. This figure
appears to be fairly representative of earlier periods as well. Thus, only
a very small proportion of those tariffs subjected to a suspension order
become the subject of a formal investigation. At the end of May 1971
the Board carried fifty-three formal rate investigations on its docket.
Twenty-two of these were at or beyond the stage of the pre-hearing
conference. Past experience indicates that it is likely that a high pro-
portion of the remaining thirty-one, those not yet set for pre-hearing
conference, will be withdrawn by the carrier. Although it is not un-
common for competing carriers and users of air transportation to re-
quest formal investigation of rate filings, their complaints are frequently
dismissed without a hearing.
148
Just as the FCC over the years has exhibited a reluctance to face
the complex economic issues involved in regulation of A.T. & T., the
CAB long avoided a full confrontation with the issues involved in the
regulation of the domestic passenger fares charged by the airlines. 49
A general investigation of the level of passenger fares, instituted in
1956, was terminated in 1960,' when the Board concluded that the
record before it was inadequate to provide a basis for fixing just and
reasonable rates.' In that investigation the Board did attempt to
elaborate certain standards to "be used in assessing future fare pro-
posals of the carriers . . .". 1"2 Even on this level, however, the
results proved less than fruitful. The standards were too vague to
145 Some of these orders involved more than 1 filing. A large proportion of the
filings received by the Board and of the suspension orders issued involve air freight
as distinguished from air passenger service.
146 Appendix B.
147 Rates applicable to foreign air transportation are not subject to suspension.
148 On occasion the Board has been challenged in the exercise of its discretion
to dismiss without hearing. See cases cited note 143 supra.
149 The Board has conducted numerous formal proceedings involving rates for
various categories of air freight. It has also had occasion to deal recurrently with
promotional fares of various descriptions, such as night coach service, family fares,
youth fares, and fares for military personnel.
150 General Passenger-Fare Investigation, 32 C.A.B. 291 (1960).
151 Id. at 328. The Board's failure to prescribe rates elicited an unsuccessful
challenge from Eastern Air Lines. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 294 F.2d 235
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961). For a complete discussion of the
origins and course of the administrative proceeding, see Redford, The General Pay-
senger Fare Investigation, in GOVER NMENT REGULATION OF BUSINEss 336 (E. Bock
ed. 1965).
152 General Passenger-Fare Investigation, 32 C.A.B. 291, 294 (1960).
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serve as an effective guide, and the opinion left some of the critical
questions untouched. An extensive investigation instituted in 1970
is now in progress ... and, considering its scope and complexity, is pro-
ceeding at a comparatively rapid pace.'
The feature of Board proceedings that significantly differentiates
its approach to ratemaking from that of other agencies is its frequent use
of what it terms the "speaking" suspension order-an order that tells
the carrier, with more or less specificity, what kind of substitute pro-
posal will be deemed acceptable. During the five years preceding the
1970 decision in Moss v. CAB,"' almost half of the Board's suspension
orders contained such advice.' 56 As carriers ordinarily wish to avoid
administrative delay, engagement in formal proceedings, and the pursuit
of unpromising causes, they have responded to speaking orders in most
instances by withdrawing the suspended tariff and filing a substitute.
57
Although the Board has issued no speaking orders since July 1970,
when Moss found an order of that species invalid, it regards the device
as a highly effective administrative tool.
To appraise the ramifications of the Moss decision one must first
examine its background.' On August 1, 1969, United Air Lines
filed for an increase in passenger fares (the second within six months)
marked to become effective on September 15, 1969. New tariffs were
filed shortly thereafter by several other trunkline carriers, with pro-
posed effective dates in late September and early October. During the
'53 The long hiatus following the inconclusive opinion of 1960 is probably
attributable in part to fairly stable rates throughout most of the ensuing decade.
'
54 See note 134 supra.
155 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
156 Letter from Vice Chairman Gillilland to Ralph S. Spritzer, Apr. 20, 1971,
copy on file in Biddle Law Library, Univ. of Pa. Law School. The Chairman added:
This advice depended, of course, upon the facts and circumstances of a
particular filing and whether the Board believed it had sufficient information
available to it at that point in the proceeding.
Id. The Board's regulations, 14 C.F.R. § 221.165 (1971), require the submission of
detailed data and information when the carrier files a tariff publication containing
new or changed rates or new or changed classifications, rules, regulations, or practices
affecting rates. Board personnel have stated to the author, however, that compliance
with this requirement has been erratic.
'
5 7 See R. CAvEs, Am TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATORS 362 (1962); cf. E.
REDFORD, THE REGULATORY PROCESS 148-49 (1969).
An indication of the industry's concern over delays in effectuating rate changes
is found in the Air Transport Association's recent proposal that the Board be denied
power to suspend fare increases in circumstances in which the carrier's rate of return
is less than 10.5%. Washington Post, Jan. 6, 1971, § D, at 8. Assistant Secretary
Charles D. Baker, speaking for the Department of Transportation, has suggested
that airlines should be permitted to adjust rates within a predetermined "zone of
reasonableness" without being subject to the initiation of Board proceedings. Phila-
delphia Inquirer, Feb. 12, 1971, at 52.
158 Facts not noted in the court of appeals' opinion are based on the record filed
with that court, and on C.A.B. Order of Investigation and Suspension, No. 69-9-68,
Docket 21,322 (Sept. 12, 1969).
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preceding months, the Board had met several times with the carriers to
discuss their economic situation. Another meeting was scheduled for
August 14. Congressman John E. Moss, a member of the House
Committee on Government Operations who had previously protested
the conduct of ex parte meetings, requested that, if the scheduled meet-
ing were held, he be permitted to attend. The Board's Chairman
responded by letter in which he refused to allow the Congressman to
attend, stating that the meeting would be a continuation of a prior
conference and would "discuss matters of the domestic fare structure
and fare formulas rather than fare level." "' He added that a tran-
script would be prepared.
On August 19, the Board called for argument on the question
whether it should suspend the proposed tariffs, permit them to take
effect while conducting an investigation, or permit them to take effect
without investigation. Congressman Moss and his congressional col-
leagues, however, refused to participate in this proceeding because they
believed that in practical effect the Board had already made its decision
on the proposed tariffs.
Following oral argument, Congressman Moss wrote to the Board's
Chairman urging that the Board confine itself to its statutory functions.
He declared that "ratemaking by treaty must come to an end," and that
it is "not the duty of the Board to propose alternative fare proposals
when the person proposing . . . changes cannot show that its proposed
change is just and reasonable." 'O Chairman Crooker's response in-
dicated that if the Board decided to suspend, it would indeed make
known its position "as to other kinds of tariff proposals it would
approve." 161
On September 12, the Board issued an order suspending the
effectiveness of the proposed tariffs on the ground that they "may be
. . . unlawful and should be suspended pending investigation." The
Board proceeded to state its "opinion that the carriers have adequately
demonstrated a need for some additional revenue" and that it "would
be disposed to grant an increase computed in accordance with the
criteria set out below." 162 The Board then set forth a comprehensive
formula, sufficiently detailed to provide a basis for computing with
precision all of the carrier's fares."e  It contained, among others, the
'59 Brief for Petitioners at 5, Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
160 Id. 10.
161 Id.
162 C.A.B. Order of Investigation and Suspension, No. 69-9-68, Docket 21,322
(Sept. 12, 1969).
163 The formula corresponded closely to the approach taken by American Airlines,
but differed markedly from that taken in the filings of other carriers. Id.
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following prescriptions: ... (1) the basis of the fare structure would be
coach fares rather than first-class fares; (2) the fixed terminal-charge
component of passenger fares would be raised to nine dollars (a sub-
stantial increase); (3) the mileage-charge component would be com-
puted on the basis of five 500-mile blocks, with a decreasing per-mile
charge for each successive block; 1 (4) first-class fares would be set at
125 percent of day-coach fares, and night-coach fares seventy-five per-
cent; (5) specified discounts from the coach fares otherwise applicable
would be permitted in the case of certain promotional fares. On the
basis of traffic movements in fiscal 1969, the Board estimated that the
indicated changes would increase the industry's revenues by 6.35 per-
cent. The Board's order further declared that the agency would con-
sider fares derived by application of its formula as "a 'just and reason-
able' ceiling, and any fare in excess of this ceiling would be viewed
prima facie as outside the realm of justness and reasonableness and
would ordinarily be suspended and ordered investigated." -"
All of the carriers promptly filed new tariffs based upon the formula
enunciated by the Board. Congressman Moss and his colleagues, as
users of the airways and representatives of their constituencies, filed a
petition for review in the court of appeals, challenging the Board's order
of September 12 and its subsequent order denying their request for
reconsideration. The issue, as stated by the court, was "whether the
Board should have followed the procedures and standards established
by Sections 1002(d) [notice and hearing] and 1002(e) [factors to be
considered in determining rates] of the [Federal Aviation] Act before
proposing the rate schedule it set forth in its September 12 order." ""
The Board's position was that these provisions of the statute were in-
applicable because the operative provision of the Board's order of that
date merely suspended the tariffs filed by the carriers.' Elaboration
of a formula that would be regarded as an acceptable basis for comput-
ing the rates was, the Board argued, advisory-merely complying with
section 1002(g) of the Act,'69 which directs the Board to state the
264 Id.
165 The taper of rates is a matter of considerable concern to carriers and one
on which they hold sharply differing views-not surprisingly, in light of differences
in route and traffic patterns.
166 C.A.B. Order of Investigation and Suspension, No. 69-9-68, Docket 21,322
(Sept. 12, 1969), quoted in 430 F.2d at 897.
167430 F.2d at 895. Section 1002(d), 49 U.S.C. §1482(d) (1970), provides
that the Board "after notice and hearing" and acting "upon complaint, or upon its own
initiative," may prescribe the rates or practices to be thereafter observed. Section
1002(e), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(e) (1970), sets out 5 factors that the Board is to consider,
among others, in exercising its ratemaking authority.
368 See 430 F.2d at 895, 898.
169 Id. Section 1002(g) is codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1482(g) (1970).
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reasons for its suspension orders. The carriers could have elected to
stand fast on their original filings; they were under no legal compulsion
to withdraw them and file substitutes conforming to the Board's sug-
gestions.
The appeals court disagreed:
As a practical matter, the Board's order amounted to the
prescription of rates because . . . the pressures on the carriers
to file rates conforming exactly with the Board's formula
were great, if not actually irresistible. All the carriers had
indicated an urgent need for an immediate increase in rev-
enues; the Board had made it clear . . . that only rates con-
forming to its detailed model would be accepted .
It explicitly stated that it would "consider fares produced
by the formula as a 'just and reasonable' ceiling, and any fare
in excess of this ceiling would be viewed prima facie as out-
side the realm of justness and reasonableness and would
ordinarily be suspended and ordered investigated." 11'
In sum, the Board forced upon the carriers "a complete and in-
novative scheme for setting all passenger rates for the continental
United States." M-1 This was done "after closed sessions with carrier
representatives, without statutory public hearings and, according to
petitioners, without reference to the rate-making standards of the
statute." 112 If rates engineered by the Board in this fashion were to
be treated as carrier-made rates because of the absence of a formal
order in terms prescribing them, judicial review would be "practically
nonexistent." M7 Although objectors could file complaints directed to
the rates that the Board allowed to take effect, "the Board's refusal
to investigate would be reviewable only for abuse of discretion. And,
170 430 F.2d at 897 (footnote omitted).
171Id. at 899.
172 Id. at 900. It may be noted that it was similarly contended in the Public
Utilities Commission of California case, discussed above, text accompanying note 103
supra, that the agency (the FCC) was participating in ratemaking in closed sessions
with A.T. & T. representatives, without statutory hearings and without reference to
statutory standards of ratenaking. The Moss opinion suggests, 430 F.2d at 899 n.33,
that the California case is distinguishable because the Ninth Circuit's opinion did not
indicate that the Commission had used the threat of its powers of suspension and
investigation, or that it had advised the Bell System about the rate filings that would
be acceptable. The distinctions are unpersuasive. If "continuous surveillance" is
anything more than continuous subservience, it is only because A.T. & T. is willing
to pay a price for the avoidance of formal proceedings. Moreover, it is plain enough,
"[a]s a practical matter," id. at 895, that the FCC becomes committed when it in-
formally negotiates rate changes with the Bell System. Perhaps the District of
Columbia court was not itself persuaded of the strength of these distinctions; it also
observed that it had "no occasion to pass upon the wisdom of [the Ninth Circuit's]
decision," as it involved "a somewhat different statute and a different industry ... "
Id. at 899 n.33.
-73 430 F.2d at 900.
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of course, it would be very difficult indeed to apply this limited standard
of review to a record made in large part behind closed doors." '
On the facts of Moss, which showed an unusually heavy involve-
ment by the agency in the fashioning of the rates, the court found
persuasive basis for its holding that in fact, though not in form, the
rates ultimately filed were Board-prescribed. Yet, it must be recognized
that most orders of suspension will be influential in some measure-in
some cases, to a very considerable extent-in shaping a carrier's future
course of action. As earlier observed, the order of suspension com-
monly leads to withdrawal of the proposal, sometimes followed by the
filing of a substitute. 7 5 The agency, moreover, is called upon to state
in writing its reasons for suspending. Obviously, the more informative
the statement, the greater the likelihood (assuming that the carrier
regards a formal case as an unprofitable venture) that it will shape the
subsequent response. How far can the agency go in stating its reasons
for suspending without running the risk that it will be found, "as a
practical matter," to have prescribed rates in violation of statutory
procedures? This Article has elsewhere argued 171 that the ICC should
provide the rate proponent greater guidance than that afforded by an
empty paraphrase of statutory criteria. Does the Moss decision sug-
gest that the agency does this at its risk; that obscurity is a virtue not
to be despised?
It is apparent that there must be some accommodation between the
provisions that confer the discretionary power to suspend rates pend-
ing investigation, a power designed to be interlocutory and not subject
to judicial review, 7 7 and the provisions that prescribe procedural
safeguards and substantive standards for the agency's exercise of its
reviewable authority to determine rates. If the power to suspend is
employed in a fashion that coercively influences the carrier to acquiesce
in a scheme of ratemaking designed by the agency-the conclusion
reached by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Moss-the
restraints upon the exercise of the federal ratemaking authority are
avoided by merely altering the form through which the power is exer-
cised. If, on the other hand, meaningful compliance with the statutory
requirement that the agency state its reasons for exercising the power
of suspension is enough to support an inference that it is engaged in
ratemaking, little is left of the precept that the exercise of the suspensory
power is a matter committed to the exclusive discretion of the agency.
-174Id. (footnote omitted).
175 See text following note 147 supra.
176 Text accompanying note 89 supra.
377 See the discussion of the history of the grant of the suspensory power to the
ICC, text accompanying notes 15-37 supra,
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The Moss court recognized the problem but concluded that the facts
before it were so clear that it was unnecessary to decide "the exact
extent of agency participation which will make an agency responsible
for the rates being charged by carriers." 118
The decisive facts for the court were that the formula adopted by
the Board in its suspension order was a complete, detailed, and in-
novative scheme, and that the pressures to accede to it were virtually
irresistible." 9 The further fact that the Board had met with the car-
riers in private sessions before reaching its solutions added weight to
the court's conviction that the procedures ought not be countenanced.
If this is a correct reading of Moss, the regulators face no serious
dilemma. The agency can ordinarily state its reasons for believing
that a proposal requires further investigation, without affirmatively
seeking to formulate a detailed substitute. It is true, of course, that in
some circumstances a meaningful statement of the deficiencies in the
carrier's proposal will tell the carrier what will pass muster. Suppose,
for example, that a carrier files for a general increase in its rates cal-
culated to produce an added $1 million in revenues. The material
submitted in support of its filing shows that half of the proposed increase
is designed to offset various increases in operating costs and that the
remainder is based upon a claim that the agency should allow a frac-
tional increase in a previously approved rate of return. Suppose, fur-
ther, that the agency is satisfied that the asserted increases in costs have
been correctly stated, and that a commensurate increase in revenues
should be allowed, but that it is not prepared to accept without investi-
gation the carrier's contention as to the appropriate rate of return. A
statement to that effect would plainly inform the carrier that a sub-
stitute proposal designed to yield $500,000 in added revenues would be
178 430 F.2d at 898.
179 The first of these findings is hardly open to challenge, and the second has
substantial support. The Board itself acknowledged that the "compulsion" to file
rates conforming to its formula was "undoubtedly great." Id. at 897 n.27. Given
these findings, it is not surprising that the court found that there was a basis for
judicial review despite the absence of a formal order directly enforcible by judicial
proceedings. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); United
States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956); Frozen Food Express v.
United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. United States,
316 U.S. 407 (1942). See also the recent decisions of the District of Columbia
Circuit in National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689
(D.C. Cir. 1971); Independent Broker-Dealers' Trade Ass'n v. SEC, 442 F.2d 132
(D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3162 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1971) (No. 70-232) ;
Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
granted, 401 U.S. 973 (1971) (No. 1162, 1970 Term; renumbered No. 70-61, 1971
Term). In the Broker-Dealers case, the court observed:
The vitality of the CBS doctrine, in finding finality and reviewability of
agency actions not issued as regulations or orders but having the consequence
and contemplation of "expected conformity," is unmistakable.
442 F.2d at 141.
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accepted without suspension. The agency should do no less. The
carrier should be told what is in issue and what is not. The Moss
holding is not contrary. The example posed above would be proscribed
by the court if the agency's order of suspension were to state, in express
terms, that the carrier was entitled to $500,000 in additional revenues,
but that a tariff providing for such increase would be accepted without
suspension and investigation only if it also provided for other changes,
such as a specifically redesigned rate structure. Though in some
situations the distinguishing line will be blurred, there is a workable
distinction between a suspension order identifying the doubtful, un-
proved, or unacceptable aspects of a carrier's proposal, and one that
seeks to use the agency's power to coerce the carrier into adopting
changes lying outside the scope of its original proposal." °
A Recommendation 181
As the Moss opinion observes, an agency may wish to respond
quickly to a tariff proposal in order to meet "the immediate revenue
needs of the carriers in times of rapidly rising costs." 182 Yet the
agency may believe that the proposal should not be permitted to take
effect without modification. The court suggests, in this connection,
that it may be appropriate to initiate a formal proceeding and to grant
interim relief when the circumstances are compelling. "Any approval
of rates under such conditions would be subject to revision once more
complete information is obtained." 183
The situation to which the court adverts is common. As rising
costs appear to be a continuing phenomenon, and overbidding by the
180 It is likely, of course, that arguments will be made for the extension of Moss
to situations in which the facts supporting judicial intervention will be less compelling
than they were in that case. One notes in this connection that several recent decisions
of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit go beyond familiar
boundaries in finding finality and reviewability in circumstances in which no conven-
tional order has been issued by the agency. See National Automatic Laundry &
Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Independent Broker-
Dealers' Trade Ass'n v. SEC, 442 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40
U.S.L.W. 3162 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1971) (No. 70-232); Medical Comm. for Human
Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 401 U.S. 973 (1971)
(No. 1162, 1970 Term; renumbered No. 70-61, 1971 Term). None of these cases,
however, involved the power to suspend. The schemes of the statutes that deal with
suspension of rates, the relevant legislative history, and a long line of judicial decisions
strongly support the view that, at least in ordinary circumstances, an order of sus-
pension is not judicially reviewable. See text accompanying notes 15-37 supra. See
also cases collected in Long Is. RK.L v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 795, 797-99
(E.D.N.Y. 1961).
181Although this proposal is presented in the context of a discussion of air
carrier regulation, it applies as well to the other regulatory schemes considered in
this paper.
182430 F.2d at 900.
183 Id. at 901; cf. National Air Carrier Ass'n v. CAB, 436 F2d 185 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
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rate proponent more expected than not, an agency is often convinced
that some increase is justified and perhaps urgent, yet unconvinced that
the carrier's proposal should be accepted in full. A system that re-
quires the agency to suspend in full or not at all is needlessly inflexible
and inflicts inequities that could be avoided."s  The device noted by
the court in Moss, however, is not a complete answer, although it may
provide a satisfactory solution in some instances. It contemplates
interim orders in the course of formal proceedings based upon less-than-
complete findings. In some circumstances, a summary technique might
serve this function far more effectively.
On occasion the federal agencies have sought to fashion a device
by which they might allow a portion of a proposed increase to take
effect in advance of a formal investigation of the carrier's filing.1 5
In a case noted earlier,"'6 the ICC suspended tariff schedules filed by
the Alaskan Railroad. Subsequently, when the carrier petitioned for
reconsideration, the Commission denied the petition, but without prej-
udice to the establishment, upon fifteen days' notice, of an interim in-
crease not to exceed a specified amount. It further required that the
publication of schedules providing for these interim increases carry a
pledge to refund any amounts collected in excess of any increase subse-
quently approved or prescribed by the Commission at the termination
of its investigation of the suspended tariff. As also noted above, the
FCC employed a somewhat similar approach when A.T. & T. filed for
large increases in November 1970.1' It requested the company to
postpone the effective date of the increases until the conclusion of an
expedited hearing and granted special permission to file for interim
increases that, the Commission indicated, would be suspended for a
brief period and then permitted to become effective subject to account-
184 The federal regulatory statutes provide for suspending the operation of a
tariff or schedule. They do not authorize suspension of a portion of an increase for
which the carrier has filed, for example, for the suspension of one-half of a proposed
10% increase in a rate or fare. It may be noted that the agencies have assumed
authority to suspend designated items when a single tariff or schedule contains a
number of discrete items. Indeed, that is a commonplace in orders of suspension
issued by the ICC.
185 In some instances, the information and data submitted contemporaneous with
the filing of the proposed increase might show that the proponent was plainly entitled
to a portion of the added revenues sought. In others, the agency might only obtain
sufficient information to justify that conclusion at some stage of the formal hearing.
As to the power of a regulatory agency to enter an interim order at an intermediate
stage of the hearing process, see FPC v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 371 U.S.
145, 154-55 (1962); New England Division Case, 261 U.S. 184, 199-201 (1923);
Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 236 F.2d 606, 608 (3d Cir. 1956).
186 Increased Rates and Charges, The Alaska Railroad, Interstate Commerce
Comm'n, I. & S. Docket No. 8604 (Sub No. 1), Order of Mar. 15, 1971.
18 7 American Tel. & Tel. Co., 27 F.C.C2d 149 (1971), discussed in text accom-
panying note 139 supra.
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ing and refund."8 The company complied, and the Commission sus-
pended the interim increases for one week.
The agencies might proceed more expeditiously and with con-
siderably less awkwardness if Congress were to grant them express
authorization to permit temporary increases. Such legislation would
also lay to rest any doubt as to whether action of the kind described
above is consistent with legislative policy. It is anomalous to grant an
agency unfettered discretion to suspend in full or to refrain entirely
from suspending, yet make no specific provision for the common
situation in which the agency can make a preliminary judgment that a
proposal appears justifiable in part and questionable in part. A delay
of six or seven months in making a change of rates effective may have
heavy impact upon the carrier or utility caught in the squeeze of rising
costs. Authority to grant temporary increases has been conferred upon
state commissions in a number of jurisdictions and may be exercised in
a manner providing not only relief for the carrier, but protection to
the customer." 9
New York law, for example, provides that the Public Service
Commission may authorize "an immediate, reasonable, temporary in-
crease" in rates charged by gas and electric utilities when it appears to
the agency's satisfaction that the "public interest requires" an increase,
or that it is "necessary for the purpose of providing adequate and
efficient service, or for the preservation of the property." 90 It may
impose such "terms, conditions or safeguards as it deems proper," in-
cluding a prescription of the purposes for which the additional revenue
shall be expended. 9' Thus, temporary increases granted under New
York law can be made subject to refund if the permanent rates pre-
scribed by the Commission prove to be lower than those temporarily
authorized. 2
188 Id. Under statutes that provide for refund of excess amounts collected during
a period of suspension, an agency can, of course, grant immediate relief to the company
by suspending the full increase for a very limited period-for example, one day-
while preserving for the ratepayers the ultimate prospect of a refund. This procedure,
however, unfairly shifts to the customers, for what may well be a very substantial
period of time, the burden of paying rates higher than those that the agency believes
are justified. The refund remedy, moreover, is not only slow; it is also highly
imperfect because, among other reasons, of the high mobility of the population. See
FPC v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 371 U.S. 145, 154-55 (1962).
189 See, e.g., N.Y. PuB. SERv. LAw §§ 66(12), 72, 92(2), 97(1) (McKinney Supp.
1970-71); PA. STAT. AxN. tit. 66, §§ 1150 (a)-(e) (1959) (Pennsylvania Public
Utility Code).
'9 0 N.Y. PuB. SERV. LAw, § 72 (McKinney 1955). Identical provision is made
in the regulation of telephone and telegraph companies. Id. § 97(1).
191Id. §72.
192 Id. It is not uncommon under the New York practice for a company to file
concurrently for a temporary increase and for a higher, permanent increase. Thus,
this year the New York Telephone Company filed for a 29.1% rate increase calculated
to yield added revenues of $391 million. It also asked for a temporary increase of
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Such an approach is consistent with the structure of the federal
regulatory statutes. Suppose, for example, that a carrier or utility
that has been experiencing increasing costs and low earnings proposes
a substantial, perhaps twenty percent, increase in its rates. Suppose
further, that a conservative, preliminary estimate by the agency in-
dicates that in all probability an increase of no less than ten percent
will prove justified. Assuming that it possessed the necessary statutory
authority, the agency could suspend the proposed twenty percent in-
crease pending investigation; authorize the carrier to file without delay
the ten percent increase; and impose as conditions of that authorization
an obligation to make no further rate changes during the pendency of
the investigation without further authorization, and an obligation to
make refunds to the extent, if any, that temporary rates exceed the rates
finally approved. 9
This may be contrasted with the pattern likely to occur under
present practices: the company files for a twenty percent increase, and
the agency suspends; at the expiration of the suspension period, the
full increases are made effective subject to refunds, since the investi-
gation has not been completed; some months later, upon the conclusion
of the proceeding, the rates are cut back, probably to a level somewhere
closer to ten than to twenty percent.
Under the scheme first outlined, the company obtains added rev-
enues without delay. If the agency's estimate of the situation is reason-
20.7%, calculated to yield $284 million on an annual basis, pending determination of
its application for the larger sum. The Public Service Commission has granted a
temporary increase that will produce an estimated $190 million per annum. See New
York Times, Feb. 17, 1971, at 1, col. 6; id., July 9, 1971, at 41, col. 1.
Consolidated Edison has also this year asked for an immediate increase that
would yield $98 million per annum in added revenues and a permanent increase that
would yield $154 million. New York Times, Apr. 1, 1971, at 1, col. 4. The company
issued a statement that it could not "afford the usual lag of about one year between
filing and approval . ." Id. 30, col. 4.
Rarely has the New York Commission granted a temporary increase and found,
at the termination of its investigation, that it should fix the rates at a level lower
than the temporary one. This did occur, however, in 1970, when the Commission
first granted New York Telephone Co. an increase to yield $136.7 million and ulti-
mately decided that the increase should be $120.8 million per year. The difference
was ordered refunded. See New York Times, Feb. 25, 1970, at 1, col. 5; July 2,
1970, at 1, col. 1; and Sept. 4, 1970, at 23, col. 5.
193 It is true that in certain situations the ordinary technique of ordering refunds
may not be feasible. There is no billing arrangement or other form of regularized
relationship between air carriers and the vast majority of their numerous passenger-
customers; in such circumstances it would be extremely costly to impose a system
of individual refunds. This, however, is not a serious objection to the grant of
temporary increases in that industry. To begin with, the agency can exercise caution
in setting the amount of the temporary increase, in order to minimize the likelihood
that it would prove excessive. If it should nonetheless turn out to have been an
excessive increase, the agency would have means of making an adjustment. It could
direct that the permanent increase should take effect in two steps: at a level lower
than would otherwise be warranted during the first stage, and at the level determined
to be "just and reasonable" for the future in the second stage. In effect, this would
provide a rough form of refund to the traveling public at large.
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ably accurate, but conservative, the company will get substantial relief
but not so much of an increase that the burdensome business of making
refunds to a large number of customers will ordinarily be necessary.
Under the second approach, the company gets no relief during the
period of suspension, the customers pay the company's "asking price"
during the interval between the expiration of the suspension period and
the termination of the case, and adjustment by a cumbersome process
of making refunds concludes the drama. It seems plain that, employed
in appropriate cases, the temporary increase can achieve a better balance
of the equities and can operate to minimize the dislocations that are an
inevitable part of the rate adjustment process.
V. THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION
The ratemaking authority of the FPC, which is conferred by Part
II of the Federal Power Act and by the Natural Gas Act, directly
affects three kinds of enterprises: electric utilities, natural gas pro-
ducers, and natural gas pipelines. In each case, the rates subject to the
agency's jurisdiction are those relating to sales in interstate commerce
for resale.194  Filing requirements are similar to those fixed by the
statutes discussed earlier, and the Commission exercises the customary
powers of suspension and investigation, including authority to order
refunds in situations in which increased rates have been put into effect
following a period of suspension. 95 The maximum period of suspension
under both statutes is five months.' 6
Rate filings of electric utilities were suspended in only twelve in-
stances in the decade 1961 to 1970.'19 Although there has been some
increase during the past year, electric rate cases have been relatively
few and of limited importance. 9 ' At the other extreme, more than
194 Federal Power Act § 201 (b), 16 U.S.C. § 824b (1970) ; Natural Gas Act
I 1(b), 15 U.S.C. § 7M7 (1970). As to the application of the Gas Act to producers,
see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
'95 Federal Power Act §§ 205, 206, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d-e (1970); Natural Gas
Act §§ 4, 5, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c-d (1970). Under the Gas Act, the authority to file
complaints with the Commission is conferred only upon a limited class: states,
municipalities, state commissions, and, in some instances, gas distribution companies.
Natural Gas Act 8§5(a), 13, 15 U.S.C. §§717d, 7171 (1970); cf. Federal Power
Act §306, 16 U.S.C. §825e (1970). Neither act confers authority to grant repara-
tions or damages for past unreasonable charges. See Montana-Dakota Util. Co.
v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1951).
196Federal Power Act §205, 16 U.S.C. §824d(e) (1970); Natural Gas Act
§4, 15 U.S.C. §717c(e) (1970).
'97 Appendix F, based on statistics contained in undated letter from FPC Chair-
man John Nassikas to Mr. Roger C. Cramton, copy on file in Biddle Law Library,
Univ. of Penna. Law School.
198 Since most electric utilities are integrated companies, i.e., are engaged in
both the generation and transmission of electric energy, most of their sales are to
ultimate consumers rather than sales for resale. With sales and exchanges between
electric companies becoming somewhat more frequent, the importance of this area of
the FPC's jurisdiction will surely increase.
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15,000 filings of natural gas producers were suspended during the same
period. 9  By and large, these suspensions did not involve individual
exercises of discretion by the Commission. Rather, they reflected the
Commission's program to establish area rate ceilings (as distinguished
from individual company rates) in the producing fields."° Pursuant to
this program, the FPC has over an extended period automatically sus-
pended all increases exceeding tentative ceilings (so called "guideline"
prices) established pending completion of the various area proceedings.
Cases resulting from these suspensions are not considered individually,
but are consolidated with the relevant area proceeding, and the matter
of refunds is determined in accordance with the decision in the area
proceeding.0°
There is little visible evidence that the FPC's use of its powers of
suspension has deterred companies subject to its jurisdiction from
initiating rate changes, and likewise little evidence that the Commission
has sought to use' those powers as a bargaining tool. During the
decade of the 1960's, none of the filings of natural gas companies were
withdrawn by the proponent. °2 Only one electric rate was withdrawn
after the Commission suspended it.2 0 3  In response to questions sub-
mitted to him, the present Chairman has stated:
The Commission does not follow the practice of advising
filing parties in advance, either formally or informally, that it
proposes to exercise its powers to suspend. Therefore, the
Commission has neither undertaken to suggest to filing parties
what kind of substitute filing would be acceptable without
suspension, nor followed the practice of suspending a filing
and then advising the filing party what kind of substitute
filing would be accepted without suspension if the original
filing were withdrawn.
There are occasions when a pipeline company will make
an inforrrial filing of a proposed rate increase with the Com-
mission staff and its customers prior to filing its formal ap-
plication for a rate increase with the Commission. The staff
199 Appendix F.
200 For a discussion of the area rate program, see the opinion in the Permian
Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968), in which the Supreme Court sustained
the FPC's decision in the first completed area proceeding.
Recently, the Commission adopted the policy of suspending increases filed by
producers for one day in situations in which it decides to enter upon a hearing.
FPC Order No. 423, Feb. 18, 1971, 36 Fed. Reg. 3464-65 (1971) (to be codified at
18 C.F.R. §2.56(g)). Although the order does not so state, this probably reflects
the Commission's conviction that the prevailing ceiling prices are obsolete in light of
the very substantial increases approved by the FPC in its recent Texas Gulf Coast
Area Case, FPC Op. No. 595 (May 6, 1971), and therefore likely to be raised.
201 FPC Op. No. 595 (May 6, 1971). See also Southern Louisiana Area Rate
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is given an opportunity in these instances to review the data
and work papers behind the Company's proposal and indicate
to the company if the staff believes the proposed rates to be
within the zone of reasonableness. Prior to filing its formal
application, however, the company has not conferred with the
Commission and has no assurance in advance of filing that the
Commission will not exercise its power to suspend.'"
The FCC, it will be recalled, has characteristically sought to avoid
major cases by reaching advance agreement with the principal regulated
company subject to its jurisdiction. The ICC had found that exercise
of the suspension power deters the carriers from persisting in their
requests in the great majority of cases. The CAB has frequently man-
aged to short-circuit formal proceedings by signaling a proposed
compromise through a "speaking" suspension order. The FPC has
generally found, however, that orders of suspension almost inevitably
lead to formal proceedings.
What is perhaps most significant in the FPC's experience from the
standpoint of administrative procedure is that, unlike the other rate-
making agencies, it has found means of settling a substantial proportion
of the formal cases that have gone to hearing205 Although this takes
the discussion beyond the primary area explored in this Article-the
uses of the summary power to suspend-it is related in the sense that
settlement has enabled the FPC to achieve in some degree what other
agencies have accomplished in substantial measure at an earlier stage
of the administrative process, the avoidance of the full-blown rate
proceeding.
Cases involving the natural gas pipelines have long been the staple
of the FPC's jurisdiction. The major pipelines all operate in interstate
commerce and engage in sales for resale. Of 183 rate-increase filings
received between 1961 and 1970 and subject to suspension, 117 (ap-
proximately sixty-four percent) were suspended.0 6 Almost all of them
involved a request for general increases in rates. Those not suspended
can generally be characterized as noncontroversial.01 In fifty instances
204 .Letter from Chairman John N. Nassikas to Administrative Conference of the
United States, Apr. 1, 1971, copy on file in Biddle Law Library, Univ. of Pa. Law
School.
205 Although the FPC has made some use of settlement procedures in a few cases
involving producers' rates, see Area Rate Proceeding, Southern Louisiana Area,
FPC Op. No. 598 (July 16, 1971), the technique has been most commonly and suc-
cessfully utilized in pipeline rate cases. The discussion that follows focuses on the
latter category.
206 Appendix F.
207 Certain rate increases are routine and occasion no objection. Suppose, for
example, that a pipeline's rates have been approved and that, shortly thereafter, its
costs increase as a direct result of an increase in the rates charged by the producers
supplying it. A "tracking" increase by the pipeline would presumably be allowed to
take effect without suspension. Observations in this section of text are derived from
sources cited note 208 infra.
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in which the rate was suspended, the Commission was able to effect a
full disposition of the case by settlement procedures.208 In an addi-
tional seventeen cases, one or more contested issues were determined by
settlement, and full proceedings were conducted to decide the remaining
issues.209 Thus, disposition of some fifty-six percent of the FPC's pipe-
line rate cases was accomplished, in whole or in part, through the use
of settlement procedures. There is no doubt that this has substantially
aided the Commission in its efforts to keep abreast of its caseload. 10
The settlements have taken place at various stages: some after the
customary pre-hearing conference but before the commencement of
hearings; others during the course of hearings; still others, after full
hearing but before initial decision by the hearing examiner or final
decision of the Commission. 1' Agreements reached by the parties to
a rate case are submitted to the Commission for its approval. Sub-
mission of briefs is omitted-although the parties may file comments-
as is the initial decision of the hearing examiner, if not already made. 12
If the agreement is approved, the Commission promulgates an order
approving the settlement, perhaps with modifications or conditions, and
making its terms effective. Although the order is ordinarily less
elaborate than an opinion in a contested case, the Commission under-
takes to explain the basis of its conclusion that the terms imposed are
in the public interest and consistent with statutory standards
213
208 These may be most conveniently identified by the FPC docket numbers:
RP 60-1, RP 60-2, RP 60-4, RP 60-7, RP 60-8, RP 60-10, RP 60-14, RP 61-1,
RP 61-2, RP 61-5, RP 61-6, RP 61-11, RP 61-13, RP 61-14, RP 61-15, RP 61-20,
RP 61-21, RP 61-23, RP 62-1, RP 62-2, RP 62-4, RP 62-6, RP 63-2, RP 63-10,
RP 64-5, RP 64-16, RP 65-2, RP 66-5, RP 66-6, RP 66-7, RP 66-8, RP 66-14,
RP 66-19, RP 68-5, RP 68-6, RP 68-7, RP 68-9, RP 68-10, RP 68-20, RP 69-1,
RP 69-3, RP 69-4, RP 70-1, hP 70-8, RP 70-9, RP 70-35, RP 70-37, kP 70-42.
209 The docket numbers are as follows: RP 60-3, RP 60-5, RP 60-8, RP 60-9,
RP 60-18, RP 61-3, RP 61-4, RP 63-1, RP 65-1, RP 67-21, RP 68-15, RP 68-16,
RP 68-17, RP 69-13, RP 70-14, RP 70-29, RP 70-40.
210 Largely as a result of inflationary pressures, the caseload has been particularly
heavy in the last several years. Of the 117 filings suspended during the period
1961-1970, 50 took place during 1969 and 1970. Appendix F. In those 2 fiscal years,
9 cases were settled in full (RP 69-1, RP 69-3, RP 69-4, RP 70-1, RP 70-8, RP 70-9,
RP 70-35, RP 70-37, RP 70-42), and 4 were settled in part (RP 69-13, RP 70-14,
RP 70-29, RP 70-40).211 The Administrative Procedure Act provides that an agency shall give all
interested parties opportunity to submit offers of settlement "when time, the nature
of the proceeding, and the public interest permit." 5 U.S.C. § 554(c) (1970). Con-
gress considered the availability of such opportunity a matter of great importance.
See SENATE CoMM. ON THE JUDIcIARY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT-LEGISLA-
T VE HISTORY, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 24, 203, 261-62, 360-61 (1946).
The courts also have laid stress upon use of the settlement technique. See, e.g.,
Michigan Consolidated Gas Co. v. FPC, 283 F.2d 204, 224 (D.C. Cir), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 913 (1960).
212 Even if the hearing has been completed prior to the time an agreement to
settle is reached, the saving resulting from an abbreviation of the decisional process
may be very substantial.
213 If all parties to a case agree to a settlement, it is a certainty that there will
be no appeal. As it is pointed out below, however, the FPC has approved settlement
proposals to which less than all of the parties subscribed. Case cited note 225 infra
& accompanying text.
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Whether a case proves susceptible of settlement obviously depends
upon many variables, some of which may lie well below the surface.
Even so, one can identify a number of factors that have made the climate
favorable to resolution of pipeline rate cases.
(a) The FPC has long required the rate proponent to file specified
information and data contemporaneous with its proposed tariff
changes. 14 In addition, the agency's practice is to call upon each party
to prepare in written form and serve in advance the expert testimony to
be offered as part of its direct case.215 As a result, the respective posi-
tions of the parties and the bases of their claims become fairly exposed
at an early stage of the case.
(b) The agency's examiners have often, if not invariably, made
effective use of the pre-hearing conference as a means of clarifying and
defining issues, thus helping to lay a groundwork for discussions of
settlement.
(c) The FPC staff has been a very active participant in rate pro-
ceedings, and its investigative capabilities have been regularly employed
to check on factual claims made by the parties and to supplement their
submissions. 216 This contributes to the parties' sense that negotiation
can take place on the basis of a reliable core of knowledge. The staff
is also in a position to act, to greater or lesser degree, as a kind of inter-
mediary or broker between the parties. The extent to which the
parties may be swayed by the staff depends, to some extent, upon their
estimate of the staff's influence with the Commission. On occasion,
presumably when the parties were satisfied that the staff spoke for the
agency, the staff has been conspicuous in its role of intermediary.
(d) Both the methodology that the FPC expects the parties to
employ in "proving" a pipeline rate case and the standards that it
applies in deciding such cases have been particularized by past practice
214
In the case of a proposed major increase by a natural gas company, the
requirements are extremely detailed. See 18 C.F.R. § 154.63 (1971). The Commis-
sion's Rules state in pertinent part that "the material relied on in the filing . . .
should be of such composition, scope, and format that it could serve as the company's
complete case-in-chief in the event the rate is suspended ..... " Id. § 154.63 (e) (1).
Until recently, similar requirements were not imposed upon electric utilities filing
for increased rates. Comparable rules, however, have now been issued. FPC Order
No. 429 Apr. 1 1971, 36 Fed. Reg. 6564 (1971) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R.§35.13 (b) (4) (v), 5 (i) ).
215;The examiner is authorized to employ this procedure by 18 C.F.R. § 1.26(c)
(iii) (1971).
21O Participation is by the Office of the General Counsel, with professional and
technical support from the Bureau of Natural Gas. The commitment of personnel
to the conduct of the rate case has been more substantial at the FPC than at the
FCC or the CAB. There is virtually no staff participation at the ICC, and the
making of the record is left to the parties.
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and by decisions. This is not to suggest that the decisional process is
inflexible or that policies are not subject to change. It is to say, how-
ever, that barring a shift in the composition of the Commission, the
rules of the game and the standards of decision are sufficiently familiar
that the result of litigating a case to the finish is apt to be fairly
predictable. When estimates of the probable outcome do not vary
widely, agreement is facilitated.1 7
(e) Generally, the principal adversaries in these cases are a pipe-
line company and the gas distribution companies that it supplies.
18
While the pipeline and its customers have conflicting interests, 219 they
also have a considerable community of interest. Certainly they form
a more homogeneous group than the contestants in most litigations.
This is reflected in the attitude of their representatives, who are in-
variably experienced in the ways of the regulatory process and familiar
with one another's positions.
Perusing these factors invites an attempt to find a general prin-
ciple applicable to other agencies. While one must be cautious in
seeking to apply one agency's experience to another, this much may be
ventured: procedures that narrow the issues and provide for an early
and full exchange of relevant data, when combined with a course of
decisionmaking that makes the agency's standards visible and pre-
dictable, are the key to expedition.
Rate cases, particularly if they involve a general increase, may
attract a substantial number of intervenors. The question arises as to
what courses are open to an agency if there is wide, but less than
unanimous, agreement on a proposal of settlement. Must it conduct a
full evidentiary hearing for the benefit of one or two dissidents, or may
it proceed to decision on the basis of written submissions and argu-
217 Inevitably, the terms of settlement are heavily influenced by decisions in
contested cases involving similar issues. The Commission reported that in fiscal 1969,
cases determined by settlement negotiations resulted in allowance of "an average of
about 50 percent of the rate increase amounts applied for." 49 FPC ANN. REP. 52
(1969). In fiscal 1970, the agency disposed of 10 pipeline cases, 8 of them by settle-
ment. 50 FPC ANN. REP. 62 (1970). The increases approved in these 10 cases
amounted to approximately 45% of the increases proposed. Id. Commenting on the
cases terminated by settlement, the Annual Report states that they were approved
"after consideration as to whether they were sufficiently close in dollar amounts to
what the Commission might have approved through the extended process of hearings,
examiners' decisions, exceptions and possible court review." Id.
218 There may, of course, be additional parties, e.g., State Public Service Com-
missions, municipalities that own their own gas distribution systems, large industrial
users of gas, or representatives of the coal industry (who are primarily interested in
issues of rate design because of the competition between coal and gas in the industrial
fuel market). When objections to a proposal of settlement are entered, they often
come from one of these types of intervenors.
219 One conflicting interest is that of price, but that conflict may be blunted if
the increase can be passed on without loss of business to competing forms of energy.
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ments, as the FPC has done in a number of instances? To pose an
extreme case, suppose that counsel representing ninety-nine percent of
a pipeline's customers agree to a settlement of the issues posed by the
carrier's suspended rate but that one small customer, a company pur-
chasing the remaining one percent, insists on an opportunity to cross-
examine all of the company's witnesses whose written testimony has
already been placed in the record.
Regulatory statutes call for a hearing-in the case of the gas and
power acts, a "full hearing." 20 The Administrative Procedure Act
provides a narrow escape hatch. Although trial-type procedures are
prescribed when rules (defined in the Act to include ratemaking 221)
"are required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for
an agency hearing," ' there is a caveat:
In rule making or determining claims for money or benefits
or applications for initial licenses an agency may, when a party
will not be prejudiced thereby, adopt procedures for the sub-
mission of all or part of the evidence in written form.
22 3
Certainly, this exception is sufficient to authorize the agency to require
the dissident to state the grounds of its objection to settlement and what
it seeks to elicit by cross-examination." 4 If the response shows that,
220Natural Gas Act §4(c), 15 U.S.C. §717c(e) (1970); Federal Power Act
§205(e), 16 U.S.C. §824d(e) (1970). Although the term "hearing" assumes
different meanings in different contexts, there can be little doubt, as Judge Henry
Friendly has stated, that to the legislators who drew the Interstate Commerce Act
(and this applies as well to the regulatory statutes modeled after it), the term
"hearing"
meant what the Supreme Court had said in I.C.C. v. Louisville & Nashville
Railroad, 227 U.S. 88, 93 (1913), "namely a proceeding in which all parties
must be apprised of the evidence submitted or to be considered, and must
be given opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, to inspect documents and to
offer evidence, in explanation or rebuttal" ....
Long Is. R.R. v. United States, 318 F. Supp. 490, 497 (F.D.N.Y. 1970) (parallel
citations omitted) (3-judge district court). See also Morgan v. United States, 304
U.S. 1 (1938) (requirements of a hearing under the ratemaking provisions of the
Packers and Stockyards Act).
2215 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970).
2221d. §553(e).
223 Id. §556(d).
224 Note that the so-called "modified procedure" rules of the ICC, 49 C.F.R.
§§ 1100.45-.54 (1971), commonly invoked by the agency, rest on the premise that an
agency may provide for a determination on the basis of written submissions unless
a request for an oral hearing is made and the basis of the request explained. Thus
its Rule 53, id. § 1100.53, states:
(a) Request for cross examination or other hearing. If cross examina-
tion of any witness is desired the name of the witness and the subject matter
of the desired cross examination shall, together with any other request for
oral hearing, including the basis therefor, be stated at the end of defendant's
statement or complainant's statement in *reply as the case may be. Unless
material facts are in dispute, oral hearing will not be held for the sole purpose
of cross examination.
(b) Hearing issues limited. The order setting the proceeding for oral
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actually, no substantial factual controversy exists, a finding of "no
prejudice" could be made. The same would be true if the agency were
in a position to rule that the facts the objector proposed to establish
would not in any event affect the decision.
The FPC, in a number of instances, has approved settlements
that did not have the unanimous support of parties to the case, 5 and
on occasion this has precipitated an appeal to the courts. 26 Either ex-
pressly or implicitly, the Commission has relied on the exception pro-
vided in the Administrative Procedure Act. The exception, however,
is one of limited utility. The resourceful lawyer who has decided not to
settle on the terms proposed-a determination that may spring from
a belief that recalcitrance has nuisance value, from a conviction that
delay itself is advantageous, or from a legitimate expectation of proving
a valid point-will usually be able to base his demand for a full hearing
on a plausible assertion that there are material issues of fact he wishes
to explore. To override such a demand is to invite litigation.
Should the quoted exception in the Administrative Procedure Act
be broadened, then, to facilitate the approval of a settlement proposal
having substantial, but less than unanimous, support from those affected
by a pending rate change? This might be accomplished by an addition
along the following lines:
hearing, if hearing is deemed necessary, will specify the matters upon which
the parties are not in agreement and respecting which oral evidence is to be
introduced.
See Allied Van Lines Co. v. United States, 303 F. Supp. 742 (C.D. Cal. 1969);
Gellhorn and Robinson, Summary JTudgment in Administrative Adjudication, 84
HARv. L. Rxv. 612 (1971); Mohundro, Improvements in Procedure Before the
Commission, 20 ICC PRAC. J., 75, 79-81 (1952); Woll, The Development of Short-
ened Procedure in American Administrative Law, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 56, 62-66 (1959) ;
cf. American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 632-33 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 843 (1966).
225 For a recent example, see Area Rates for the Appalachian and Illinois Basin
Area, FPC Order No. 411, Oct. 2, 1970.
226 In Cities of Lexington, Etc., Ky. v. FPC, 295 F.2d 109, 119-22 (4th Cir.
1961), a settlement of a pipeline rate case was challenged by the single party (Lynch-
burg Gas Co.) that had refused to subscribe to the agreement. Lynchburg contended
that the FPC, having suspended the pipeline's rates and announced that a hearing
would be held, was required to go through with the hearing prescribed by §4(e) of
the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §717c(e) (1970), in the absence of unanimous con-
sent. The Fourth Circuit rejected this contention on the ground that nothing in the
Administrative Procedure Act "requires unanimous consent of all the participating
parties to an agreement of settlement" and that to read such a requirement into the
statute "would effectually destroy the settlement provision." 295 F.2d at 121.
More typical of the settlement orders apt to provoke litigation is the FPC's
order in Manufacturers Light and Heat Company, Docket No. RP 69-16, Oct. 30,
1970, approving a settlement over the objection of Pennsylvania Gas and Water
Company, one of Manufacturers' customers. The Commission's position was that,
assuming the correctness of the underlying facts asserted by Pennsylvania Gas, the
settlement was an appropriate one. Pennsylvania Gas, on the other hand, contended
that an analysis of the agency's order showed that in fact it rejected petitioner's
factual claims without a hearing, relying instead upon conflicting material submitted
by other parties. The case is now pending on review. Pennsylvania Gas & Water
Company v. FPC, No. 71-1126 (D.C. Cir., filed Feb. 18, 1971).
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In a proceeding involving the prescription of rates for the
future, if it appears that a substantial majority of the parties
primarily affected agree to a proposal to settle one or more
issues in the proceeding, the agency may, in its discretion,
adopt procedures for the submission of all or part of the evi-
dence pertaining to such issue or issues in written form.
However, in determining whether there is substantial sup-
port for a proposal of settlement the agency shall consider the
extent to which the parties to the proceeding are acting in a
representative capacity.m7
The objective of such a provision, of course, would be to expedite the
multiparty rate cases that so often prove to be protracted and un-
wieldy. Preparation for cross-examination itself may extend over
numerous hearing days.28  Moreover, it usually stimulates a further
round of rebuttal testimony and cross-examination of rebuttal witnesses.
It should be added that, in the view of some observers, cross-
examination has only limited utility in the typical rate case. Most of
the "hard" evidence, they point out, is statistical and documentary, and
its verification rarely depends upon the examination of witnesses.2
9
227 Since the focus of this study is on ratemaking, the proposal in the text is
confined to that subject, though it might also be adapted to certain other types of
proceedings. It should also be noted that the proposal could take the form of an
amendment to 1 or more of the regulatory statutes conferring ratemaking powers,
an approach that would permit experimentation on a selective basis. Two additional
points may call for further comment. First, the term "primarily affected" is designed
to enable an agency, in administering the proposed provision, to distinguish between
the class of persons for whose benefit the statute was enacted (in the case of the
Natural Gas Act, the consumers of natural gas) and those who, though they may
have sufficient interest to justify intervention (such as sellers of a competitive form
of energy), are not the intended beneficiaries of the statute. See National Coal
Ass'n v. FPC, 191 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (standing of coal producers in natural
gas cases). Secondly, the final sentence of the proposal directs the agency to dis-
tinguish between an intervenor representing only his own interests (such as an
industrial consumer of natural gas) and one representing a large class of affected
persons (such as a state public utility commission or a municipality).
228 This is not to suggest that a party bent on prolonged cross-examination must
be given his head:
The requirement of an evidentiary hearing is not a mandate of a prolfix pro-
cedure protracted beyond endurance and beyond the requirements of the issues.
Even in the most formal proceedings a capable hearing officer can evolve
techniques that both expedite the proceeding and illuminate the issues.
Marine Space Enclosures, Inc. v. FMC, 420 F2d 577, 590 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
229 Some years ago, the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Pro-
cedure noted:
In the typical case tried in a court of law, there is frequently conflicting
testimony by lay witnesses as to matters of ordinary fact; as a corollary,
there is a distinct advantage in having the witnesses personally testify before
the court in order that their veracity may be gaged from their conduct and
demeanor. In a proceeding to fix rates or to determine the need for addi-
tional transportation facilities, much of the evidence is documentary in char-
acter, presented in the form of exhibits, and it is safe to say that at least
90 percent of the material which is presented by the direct testimony of
witnesses could as well have been prepared in exhibit form. The informa-
tion relevant to the fixing of rates is largely taken from the records of the
19711
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Moreover, the opinions expressed in the testimony are largely those of
trained experts, persons not likely to be trapped by counsel or caught in
"[s] elf-contradiction under cross-examination." 10 They may be more
effectively answered, it is suggested, by the opinions of other experts.
Yet, there are countervailing considerations. Cross-examination
of an expert will sometimes prove revealing even if it does not show
falsification or yield self-contradiction. Brice Clagett points out that
"[a]n 'expert' making 'estimates' or 'forecasts' necessarily makes cer-
tain assumptions, relies on certain data, and engages in certain in-
tellectual processes which he regards as rational." Why, he asks, "is
it necessarily not useful to require him to testify about these matters,
rather than allowing him to hide behind the anonymous expertise of an
agency opinion writer?" 21 Judge Harold Leventhal, writing in a
case that involved an agency's disposition of difficult legal-economic
issues commented, "Even though there may be no disputed 'adjudi-
catory' facts, the application of the law to the underlying facts involves
the kind of judgment that benefits from ventilation at a formal hear-
ing." 22 A point often neglected is that the examination of expert
witnesses on the stand may provide clarification, understanding, and
insight not easily derived from a welter of canned testimony or from
counsel's advocacy. As one experienced examiner has put it, "An
effective cross-examination can bring to life for the weary presiding
examiner the nub of the controversy in a way that weeks and months
of lonesome reading of the undiluted mass of written material could not
possibly achieve." 23
These considerations carry weight. Accordingly, the proposal
suggested above is not grounded on the proposition that cross-examina-
tion is of small use in rate proceedings and that therefore the dissident
loses little or nothing if denied access to that tool. It rests rather on
a pragmatic judgment composed of several ingredients: the adminis-
carrier and the [agency] and relates to such matters as traffic trends and
operating costs. Conflicts as to the accuracy of data involving a determina-
tion of the veracity of particular witnesses are almost nonexistent.
ATTORNEY GExERAI.'s COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, MONOGRAPH No. 19,
CIVIL AElRONAUTICS AUTHORITY (1941), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 10, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 6, at 38 (1941).
280 Prettyman, How to Try a Dispute Under Adiulication by an Administrative
Agency, 45 VA. L. REv. 179, 190 (1959).
231 Clagett, Informal Action--Adudication--Rule Making: Some Recent Devel-
opments in Federal Administrative Law, 1971 DUxE LJ. 51, 79 (emphasis in original).
See also, Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rule-
making and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. RV.
485, 521 (1970).
232 Marine Space Enclosures, Inc. v. FMC, 420 F2d 577, 589 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
233 Zwerdling, A Plea for Clemency for Cross-Examination, 57 A.B.AJ. 45, 47
(1971).
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trative burdens imposed by rate cases can be significantly eased by
the use of settlement procedures; the advantages to be derived from
use of the settlement technique are considerably diminished if a dissident
is in a position to force extended cross-examination by insisting upon
the exploration of certain material facts and issues; cross-examination,
though it has its values, need not be regarded as indispensable to the
kind of quasi-legislative judgments characteristically made in rate cases;
if a proposal of settlement is supported by a substantial majority of
those primarily affected by a rate increase, the balance of considerations
is altered, and there is an added basis for confidence that a solution
within the proverbial "zone of reasonableness" is attainable without
full-blown proceedings. In these circumstances, the proposed addition
to the Administrative Procedure Act would permit, but not require, the
agency to make its decision on the basis of written submissions.
VI. POSTSCRIPT: A NOTE ON JUDICIAL REVIEW
A discernible trend has emerged, particularly marked in the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (where a heavy share of
the cases are brought), in the direction of increased judicial review of
federal agency determinations. More and more, the courts have come
to look to the practical impact of agency action, or inaction, upon the
complainants in circumstances in which there is no formal or final order
in the traditional sense.234 Yet, even in those cases in which the courts
have shifted somewhat the accustomed boundaries, they have pur-
ported to abide by certain limiting precepts: review will not be forth-
coming if there is a "persuasive reason to believe" 235 that it was clearly
the purpose of Congress to preclude it, if the issues are inappropriate
for judicial resolution, or if judicial intervention would be disruptive
of the administrative process.2 6
234 See, e.g., National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443
F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (authoritative interpretive ruling of the Administrator of
the Wage and Hour Div., Dep't of Labor, as to coverage of the Fair Labor Standards
Act, held reviewable in advance of institution of enforcement proceedings); Inde-
pendent Broker-Dealers' Trade Ass'n v. SEC, 442 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3162 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1971) (No. 70-232), (SEC action, including
writing letters to N.Y. Stock Exchange concerning the Exchange's minimum rate
structure and related rebating practice, held reviewable, though letters were called
"requests," because of pressures to conform that letters exerted); Medical Comm.
for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 401 U.S.
973 (1971) (No. 1162, 1970 Term; renumbered No. 70-61, 1971 Term) (no action
letter issued by SEC in administration of its proxy rules held reviewable).
235 Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967). See also Associa-
tion of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) ; Barlow v.
Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 167 (1970).
236 See cases cited notes 180, 234 supra. See also Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d
1243 (1st Cir. 1970), in which the court formulated the criteria for judicial review-
ability of agency action as follows:
In the absence of a clear declaration of Congressional intent, three factors
1971]
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Judged by these considerations, the case against review of agency
decisions suspending or refraining from suspending rates remains a
strong one. This is not, of course, to deny what has been affirmatively
stressed in the preceding discussion, that those decisions may indeed
have immediate and significant consequences for the rate proponent and
the rate payer. Rather, it is to assert the proposition, at times perhaps
neglected, but hardly novel, that some questions of practical import
remain that, all things considered, are better decided without the benefit
of litigation in the courts.
As earlier elaborated,28 7 the history of the suspension provisions of
the Interstate Commerce Act shows, clearly and convincingly, that
Congress intended to settle the once disputed question whether the
courts might exercise their equitable powers to enjoin a carrier from
putting into effect a tariff schedule duly filed with the Commission, by
entrusting solely to the agency the discretionary power to restrain such
rate increases, subject only to the limitation that the suspension might
not exceed the statutorily prescribed period. The Supreme Court has
squarely adopted this view in Arrow Transportation Co. v. Southern
Railway Co.2'3 In that case, in which the equities in favor of a further
restraint on railroad rate increases were particularly strong, 30 the Court
concluded that the judiciary had no power to grant relief. Although
the holding went only to the point that the courts lacked power to
impose their own injunction and did not rule on the question whether
the courts have any authority to review an agency's exercise or non-
exercise of its suspension power, the Court's reasoning is not so nar-
rowly confined. Congress, it observed, was mindful of the "close nexus
between the suspension power and the Commission's primary juris-
diction to determine the lawfulness and reasonableness of rates" and
"meant to foreclose a judicial power to interfere with the timing of rate
changes . . *.., 240 Nothing in the development of later regulatory
statutes that conferred similar powers of suspension upon other rate-
making agencies detracts from this reading of the original intent.
seem to us determinative: first, the appropriateness of the issues raised for
review by the courts; second, the need for judicial supervision to safeguard
the interests of the plaintiffs; and third, the impact of review on the effec-
tiveness of the agency in carrying out its assigned role.
Id. at 1249.
237 Text accompanying notes 15-37 supra.
238372 U.S. 658 (1963).
239The controversy involved the expiration of a suspension order issued by the
ICC. A complaining barge line had instituted judicial proceedings on the basis of
allegations that it would be put out of business by the rail rates under investigation
before the administrative proceeding could be concluded. Id.
24 Id. at 668 (emphasis by the court).
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Pragmatic considerations point the same way. Consider, first, the
case in which an agency has simply refrained from suspending a car-
rier's rate increase. Its inaction presumably reflects a determination
that the proposed rate appears reasonable. The basis of its evalua-
tion, however, is unknown. It may have rested upon any number of
different grounds: an evaluation of data filed by the carrier in support
of its proposal; information derived from the agency's files; inferences
drawn from informal inquiries hastily initiated by the agency staff;
specialized knowledge of conditions in the industry; the approach taken
in other cases thought to be comparable; or a combination of any of
these bases for judgment. Without the benefit of a record or findings,
it is plain that no court would be equipped to pass upon the agency's
exercise of discretion. On the other hand, requiring the agency to
make the minimal kind of record and findings essential to meaningful
review would be incompatible with the operation of the statutory
scheme. The agencies face a veritable flood of filings, and the decision
whether to suspend must be made within thirty days.
Much the same is true of the case in which the agency has affirma-
tively decided to exercise its power to suspend. If the sufficiency of the
agency's reasons for acting were to be subjected to meaningful review,
the court would need something more than their bare statement. Again,
the volume of filings and the limitations of time and personnel preclude
the adoption of procedures calculated to produce an adequate record.
Even if there were some basis for conducting a satisfactory review of
rate suspension orders, it is difficult to believe that it would often prove
to be a productive enterprise. The agency's decision to suspend should
be entitled to at least a presumption of correctness. The time spent in
litigating the issue would run concurrently with the period of sus-
pension. Thus, the issue of the validity of the agency's preliminary
determination might become moot before it was decided by the review-
ing court. Moreover, if the parties were to become enmeshed in a con-
test over the bases of the agency's decision to initiate its investigation,
it would tend to disrupt the continuity of the agency's proceeding. 41
241 Recent cases in which the federal courts did undertake to review orders of
suspension are worth noting, even though they arose in statutory contexts other than
ratenaking and turn on their own facts.
In Aquavella v. Richardson, 437 F2d 397 (2d Cir. 1971), the Secretary of HEW
had suspended Medicare payments to a nursing home that was almost entirely de-
pendent on those payments for its revenues. The suspension was to continue until
the Secretary determined, on the basis of a complete audit, whether the home had
engaged in suspected irregularities. The plaintiffs sued for injunctive relief alleging
that the Medicare Act did not authorize suspension of payments and that the Secre-
tary was seeking to frustrate judicial review by suspending payments rather than
terminating the agreement with the home (an action that would have been review-
able under the terms of the Medicare Act). The court ruled that the order 'of
1971]
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If, as this Article suggests, there are deficiencies in the exercise of
summary power by the ratemaking authorities, the conclusion to be
drawn is that the remedies had best be provided by Congress and the
administrative agencies themselves.
suspension was "final agency action" reviewable under § 10(c) of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970). The ruling rested, however, on the fact
that the suspension had been in effect over 18 months without further formal action
by the Secretary, and the court indicated that it would not have been likely to
intervene at the stage of suspension "if there were regulations providing for a
reasonably prompt administrative review of the preliminary action." 437 F2d at 404.
In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
the complainants had petitioned the Secretary of Agriculture to exercise his emer-
gency powers under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 135-135k (1970), by suspending the use of DDT. The Secretary, who is authorized
to suspend, pending the conduct of further expedited proceedings, upon a finding
that such action is "necessary to prevent an imminent hazard to the public," Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act §4, 7 U.S.C. §135b(c) (1970), had
taken no action on the suspension request. Noting that the complainants had
submitted to the Secretary extensive evidence of the harmful effects of DDT and
that, if they were right, "even a temporary refusal to suspend results in irreparable
injury on a massive scale," 428 F.2d at 1099, the court concluded that "[tihe
controversy over interim relief [was] ripe for judicial resolution . . . ." Id. Con-
cluding, however, that it was impossible to provide meaningful review in the absence
of a record, the court remanded to the Secretary, stating:
If he persists in denying suspension in the face of the impressive evidence
presented . . ., then the basis for that decision should appear clearly on
the record, not in conclusory terms but in sufficient detail to permit prompt
and effective review.
Id. at 1100.
Cf. Nor-Am Agricultural Products, Inc. v. Hardin, 435 F2d 1151 (7th Cir.
1970), petition for cert. dismissed, 402 U.S. 935 (1971). There, the Secretary had
exercised his power to order an emergency suspension under the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, and the complainants were persons engaged in the
business of manufacturing and selling the banned product. The court, en banc,
ruled that the interim order did not constitute "final agency action" and that judicial
review was unavailable in advance of completion of the formal administrative pro-
ceeding. The Environmental Defense Fund case was distinguished on the ground
that in that case "there were no further administrative proceedings available to the
interested parties . . . ." Id. at 1159.
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